By David Gitter and Robert Sutter
Despite a persistent security threat from China, the island’s greatest problem is domestic political wrangling.
As the clock ticks down to Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections on January 16, cross-strait relations appear to be at a crossroads. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Tsai Ing-wen is widely expected to win the presidency, but unlike her Kuomintang (KMT) opponent Eric Chu she has not indicated acceptance of Beijing’s bottom line for smooth cross-strait ties, namely the vague principle open to different interpretations that there is only “one China.” Of course, Beijing continues to affirm that Taiwan must eventually unify with the mainland, and has never foresworn the use of force to see its imperative through. Given the Xi Jinping government’s pursuance of nationalistic goals with bold rhetoric and tactics despite serious issues at home, hopes that Beijing will not choose assertive cross-strait policies following a DPP victory may be in vain.
In anticipation of possibly acute and protracted Chinese belligerence toward the Republic of China (ROC), a broad assessment of Taiwan’s foundations of national power can help identify areas of strength, weakness, and existential danger to the island democracy. Such an analysis conducted by the authors in a recently published NBR report finds that Taiwan has played a weak hand well in the face of a massive external threat, but its policies have not been optimal due to a lack of cooperation between Taiwan’s two main political parties.
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