By Harry Kazianis
In a recent article here in Flashpoints, William Yale attempts to make the case that Air-Sea Battle is, as the title points out a “dangerous, unaffordable threat.” Indeed, such an argument has been made before among a vocal crowd here in Washington defense circles. One of the chief concerns among such anti-ASB voices is the often repeated fear that “long-range strikes deep within the Chinese mainland, are highly escalatory and offer no good way to end a limited war.” Unfortunately for Yale and others who make similar arguments against ASB, the operational concept has evolved and matured – while their line of attack has not.
In order to debate the issue, one must have an idea of what ASB is today, and not what it was or at least was perceived to be in the past.
But first, it’s worth noting that ASB is easily misunderstood. That’s because much of the analysis and controversy is driven from the first major ASB publication, the 2010 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments study (PDF) (which according to at least one source received no input from DOD). ASB has evolved dramatically since this founding document, as attested to by the Joint Operational Access concept (PDF), comments by senior officials as well as public documents from the ASB office itself (PDF).
Read the full story at The Diplomat