Editorial: China outmanoeuvers Indian forign policy in South Asia

By Dr. Subhash Kapila 

“Furthermore, contemporary Chinese perceptions of other states are strongly colored by China’s interpretation of their assumed cultural proclivities. These cultural images of other countries, particularly the images of strategic cultures of other countries are influential as China assesses threats and potential threats in the international environment”--------Dr Arthur Scobell, American noted specialist on China’s strategic culture. 

India has achieved a fair measure of foreign policy successes as far as South East Asia and East Asia are concerned and could be said to be following a well calibrated strategy in these regions with long term gains in mind.

Regrettably, in South Asia right under its nose, where Indian foreign policy successes are most needed, India seems to have been totally outmanoeuvred by China’s grand strategy and diplomatic moves.

India as the most predominant power in South Asia in virtually all dimensions of the word should in the sixth decade after its independence  have been in a powerful position to re-order its South Asia neighbourhood in consonance with its national security interests.

India’s national attributes of power abundantly bestowed on it should have facilitated India to create enough political, economic and strategic leverages to back up its diplomacy in South Asia. The picture however is otherwise.

The obvious question that then emerges is that if India could well manage its relationships with major powers, excepting China, and achieves some measure of success in East Asia and South East Asia, what factors bedevil and limit India’s foreign policy successes in South Asia.

The answer revolves around China as the ‘spoiler state’ in Asian security and Chinese foreign policy strategy of employing in turn proxy ‘spoiler states’ in its regional power-play on its peripheries e.g. North Korea against Japan in East Asia and Pakistan against India in South Asia.

Significantly, China’s use of regional ‘spoiler states’ is directed primarily at the two states that can checkmate China’s hegemonic control over the Asian security landscape.

In pursuance of its overall regional spoiler states strategy, China has outclassed and outmanoeuvred India’s foreign policy in South Asia. India cannot bemoan that but for the Chinese intrusive strategic presence in South Asia facilitated by Pakistan’s unremitting military hostility towards India, the picture could have been otherwise. India cannot argue that but for China and its proxy use of Pakistan, India would have achieved the same measure of foreign policy successes in South Asia.

Conceding that India stands strategically and diplomatically limited in South Asia by China and Pakistan, what has impeded Indian diplomacy in succeeding with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives?  Why has India failed to resort to assertive counter-moves to ensure that the ‘Chin-Pakistan Radiation’ does not singe India’s strategic interests in these smaller countries?

Why has the Indian policy establishment failed on the South Asian chessboard where its national attributes of power could have come into play more intensely due to geographical proximity? Is it because the Indian policy establishment has a better ‘farsight reading’ and its ‘nearsight reading ‘capability is limited? Do they need better bi-focals? The answer is obviously ‘yes’

China and Pakistan as military adversaries of India have resorted to only the bare modicum of diplomatic niceties with India. Their emphasis has not been on investing in long-term good-neighbourly relations with South Asia’s pre-eminent power but in adopting strategies to under-cut and under-mine India’s relationships with India’s other smaller South Asian neighbours . The overall aim of both these adversarial nations has been to diminish India’s strategic stature in the region, in Asia and globally.

Putting it more bluntly, it can be asserted that China has been able to out-manoeuvre Indian foreign policy in South Asia primarily because China’s main thrust in South Asian policy formulations is to give primacy to the ‘strategic component’ as opposed to India’s over-reliance on pure diplomacy heavily relying on peace dialogues, unilateral peaceful initiatives and peace symbolism and thereby utterly devoid of the strategic component befitting its geostrategic and geopolitical significance in the regional and global power-play.

China’s main thrust on the South Asian chess-board is to adopt a dual strategy comprising application of ‘strategic pressure-points’ against India on all of India’s peripheries and buttressed by maintaining the India-Chinese Occupied Tibet border in the high Himalayas under constant tension and over-militarisation of Occupied Tibet.

This arises from an accurate reading by China of India’s strategic culture or better put the lack of strategic culture in India’s political and civil bureaucratic hierarchy which stands severely disadvantaged by deliberately keeping out Indian Armed Forces military hierarchy from “inclusive” and direct participation in India’s higher strategic decision-making.

China has been successful in outmanoeuvring Indian foreign policy in South Asia because the Indian policy establishment does not take pains to study and understand China’s centuries- old uninterrupted strategic culture and its more subtle signalling in contemporary times. This deficiency stands brought out by India’s former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran in a recent lecture.

Resulting from the above is the total lack of Indian ripostes against China and Pakistan of counter-strategic pressure points as India is not devoid of any number of options in its armoury to be so used. This reluctance arises from political timidity in decision-making.

India has shirked from using the ‘Tibet Card’ more directly against China and by extension even the ‘Xinjiang Card’ to stop China in its tracks of its India’s strategic diminution strategy. India has shirked heavily against using the ‘Balochistan Card’ and the ‘Northern Areas Card’ against Pakistan even after Mumbai 26/11 when shirking from using hard power. India could have at least played the above cards against Pakistan to tame its propensities of terrorist attacks in India’s heartland.

South Asia consequently today rightly presents a grave-yard of India’s foreign policies in all the four corners of the Indian Sub-Continent and does not lend any optimism that the Indian foreign policy establishment is applying course-corrections to overcome its past failings. A quick survey would be in order.

China and Pakistan are the prime obsessions of India’s foreign policy not in terms of bold adoption of strategically discomfiting these two notable Indian military adversaries but significantly standing out in terms of Indian foreign policy planning timidly seeking “thaws” where none exist. China and Pakistan accurately divining this Indian timidity spasmodically keep throwing these “thaws” at India which is avidly lapped-up by the Indian policy establishment and even the Indian media. In the process India’s foreign policy gets distorted by these spasmodic and temporary “thaws”

India’s propensity to desperately cringe for China’s and Pakistan “thaws” does not go unnoticed in the rest of India’s South Asian neighbourhood. To India’s strategic and political disadvantage the smaller South Asian countries start employing their ‘China Card’ and their ‘Pakistan Card’ against India.

China’s strategic dragnet and economic allurements have weaned away Nepal as the only Hindu kingdom in the world; China is in the process of weaning away Bhutan from India’s fold; Bangladesh which was not recognised by China following the rest of the world, now has a Strategic Partnership with Bangladesh for a number of years; Sri Lanka disgusted with India’s inability to prevent domestic Tamilnadu politics distorting a meaningful relationship with India has opted for countervailing relations with China and even Pakistan; Indian diplomatic ineptness has resulted in our losing control over the Maldives.

Structural and institutional shortcomings do stymie India’s lack of foreign policy successes in South Asia. But then the same yardstick should be operative in cases of East Asia and South East Asia where successes have been achieved

 In my assessment while India’s political leaders leave foreign policy formulations in other regions to career diplomats and the institutionalised foreign policy processes and hence the successes, in case of South Asia, Indian political leaders have a propensity to “personalise” India’s foreign policy in accordance with their own inclinations and obsessions. Resultantly, the ‘political component’ begins to outweigh the strategic and diplomatic component in India’s foreign policies in South Asia.

Concluding, it needs to be stressed that India must arrest the on-going trend of China being able to outmanoeuvre India’s foreign policy in South Asia. India thus gets strategically diminished on the global stage and disrespected in its own neighbourhood. Some observations from the foregoing discussion that need to be stressed in conclusion are as follows:

• China and Pakistan will continue as military adversaries of India for decades to come and this should be the prism through which India’s foreign policy formulations should take place and the bedrock on which India’s South Asia foreign policy options are devised.
• India’s propensity to “cringe” for “thaws” spasmodically thrown at it by China and Pakistan must be restrained. This is the propensity of feeble nations and does not befit India’s national attributes of power and her strategic potential.
• Maintaining the minimum modicum of diplomatic niceties with China and Pakistan, the strategic component in Indian foreign policy formulations should be the dominant strand.
• In the rest of South Asia, Indian foreign policy formulations the conventional diplomatic, economic and cultural strands should be pursued.
• With China and Pakistan being strategically and militarily pervasive in South Asia, India’s foreign policy formulations in South Asia should no longer be politicised and dominated by the personal inclinations and obsessions of its apex political leadership
• China- checkmating by India from making strategic inroads in South Asia at India’s expense demands that India too should apply counter-strategic pressure points on China’s peripheries and its outlying regions, more specifically Tibet. Like Chinese acupuncture India’s needles should be applied further afield in Afghanistan, Myanmar. Vietnam and Mongolia.
• India has a natural ally in Japan and this relationship should be strategically intensified.

This Article first appeared on SAAG.

Editorial: Japan - Coping with 'The China Threat'

By Dr Subhash Kapila 

“The real issue at stake is the battle for supremacy in Asia, the duel between the region’s dominant economy on one hand and its strategic power on the other, because for the first time in their history China and Japan are both regional powers at the same time.”

“Despite all the cooperation and declarations of friendship, the rivalry between the two countries remains a pervasive obsession in both Beijing and Tokyo.”

“Converging economic interests never eclipse mutual distrust because everything keeps them apart, whether the interpretation of the past, their perceptions of the present, or their version of the future; memories of unhealed wounds yesterday, the rise of nationalist sentiments today, rival ambitions tomorrow.”

                                                                                                                                                     

----Claude Meyer, International Economist and Banker, 2011. 

Introductory Observations

China’s “Not So Peaceful Rise” lately seems to have strategically flagged the 21st Century as a century whose coming decades will be marked by the intensification of ‘The China Threat’ as the over-riding threat perception in all major countries on its peripheries. Stretching across the Asia Pacific from India to Japan, ‘The China Threat’ factor weighs heavily in the security planning and formulations of Asian countries.

Japan unlike India has never been directly attacked by China after its emergence as Communist giant in 1949. Notwithstanding this ‘The China Threat’ did manifest itself on the footsteps of Japan when Chinese military forces during the Korean War swooped down to very nearly the southern tip of South Korea. Japan was drawn into the Korean War, not as a combatant US Ally but along with Okinawa provided the major base-support for the United States war effort on the Korean Peninsula and the push- back by US Forces of Chinese Communist forces all the way to the Yalu River on China’s doorsteps.

Japan thereafter has been the lynch-pin of the US security architecture in East Asia.

The strategic picture obtaining in 2013 is that China’s stupendous military expansion not checkmated in the first decade of the 21st Century by the United States has resulted in ‘The China Threat’ looming large over the Asia Pacific strategic expanse. Reasons of China’s aggressive posturing in the Asia Pacific more markedly stand analysed in my preceding papers on this website.

‘The China Threat’ figures significantly in Japan’s threat perceptions today and this gets manifested in Japan’s White Papers on Defense and in Japanese strategic literature.

International observers have noted that the strategic jostling between China and Japan carries ominous overtones of concern, both in regional and global terms.  Intertwined intensely in this tussle are the strategic interests of the United States and US security and nuclear umbrella commitment to Japan.

Japan unlike India takes its security threats very seriously and in Japanese traditional style it has for the last few years engaged in putting under way a host of strategic, political and military measures to cope with ‘The China Threat’ that is acquiring accentuated contours with each day passing.

This Paper intends to examine the main theme of the Paper under the following heads:

• Japan & China: The Strategic Perceptions of Each Other
• Japan’s Security Perceptions on ‘The China Threat’
• Japan’s Gearing-up to Cope with ‘The China Threat’
• Japan Towards New Security Horizons.

This paper does not intend to get into a statistical survey of the military balance in East Asia but confine itself to a broad survey of the fundamentals of major issues involved. 

Japan & China: The Strategic Perceptions of Each Other

In 2013 the picture obtaining is that both Japan and China strategically distrust each other to the point of actively figuring in each other’s threat perceptions. This mutual distrust of both nations arises from a complex mix of historical, strategic, political and military factors. Territorial disputes figure prominently today focussed on the Senkaku Islands, which China claims them based on historical rights.

Historically, even when China was mighty and powerful, it could not subjugate or dominate Japan as it did the other Asian countries. In the last century, in the run-up to the Second World War, Japan occupied sizeable territories of China and continued to do so till its defeat in 1945 by the United States. China stands scarred by this humiliation.

Strategically, China perceives Japan as the only Asian country not only capable of standing up to a militarily rising China but also contending with it for leadership of Asia. That both nations lie in proximity to each other in the Western Pacific makes this rivalry more accentuated for reasons analysed in my previous Paper.

Japan’s long standing alliance with the United States under the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty is the biggest eye-sore for China. This enables the United States to position sizeable US Forces in Japan and Okinawa, virtually on the doorsteps of China. The Forward Military Presence of US Forces coupled with the potent high-technology Japanese military machine achieves twin military objectives of deterrence and checkmating any unrestrained Chinese military aggressiveness.

Earlier, this was aimed at any Chinese forcible military take-over of Taiwan. In 2013, as part of US re-balancing of its forces it will extend wider to the Asia Pacific Region, with Japan playing a major role in US security architecture.

Politically, China perceives Japan as furthering the US national interests in the Asia Pacific by exercising Japanese ‘soft power’ to US political advantage and in which the United States was handicapped. The Japanese espousal sometime of an ‘Arc of Democracies’ in Asia was seen by China as a proxy strategic move on behalf of US clothed in political verbiage.

Militarily, Japan outweighs China in many fields despite Chinese contemporary asymmetric advantages. Japan has a strong national strategic culture distinguished by exercise of military power and the will to use military power. Its armed forces have rich military traditions of battling against all odds. Japan has a sizeable self-reliant high-technology defence production infrastructure capable of overnight doubling of production. The deliberate adoption of a low military profile by Japan after 1945 misleads many people into thinking otherwise.

Militarily, in the maritime domain the Japanese Coast Guard is a significant force-multiplier for an already powerful Japanese Navy. It is the most powerful Navy in Asia in my estimation.

Japan’s undisputed superiority in technologies of IT, communications and surveillance and stealth warfare technologies provide her with the prerequisites and assets of modern warfare for all her three Services.  

Japan’s Gearing –up to Cope with ‘The China Threat’

Japan unobtrusively but surely has been engaged in preparing itself to cope with the magnifying threat from China. In my estimation Japanese defence planning is engaged in this for two separate contingencies. The first as part of the US Military Alliance and an overall integrated US military strategy in the Asia Pacific and the second contingency I believe Japan is also planning to go it alone should for some reason the US security and nuclear umbrella becomes leaky for political reasons.

Here again Japanese efforts to cope with ‘The China Threat’ needs to be viewed from the strategic, political and military perspectives as part of a comprehensive Japanese strategy.

Strategically, Japan’s military alliance with the United States is the sheet-anchor of Japanese strategy to cope with ‘The China Threat’. It encompasses hosting sizeable US Forces in Japan and in Okinawa in close vicinity of China, integration of strategic plans, joint training and joint responses planning. Both Japan and China maintain a very high state of military vigilance in the region.

Strategically, Japan is engaged in evolving strategic partnerships with India and Australia. Opening moves have been made to form a US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral. Japan’s priority in establishing a sound Japan-India Strategic Partnership is significant as in balance of power terms as it combines Asia’s two other powerful contenders, both having territorial disputes with China.

Politically, Japan makes special effort in terms of special relationships with ASEAN countries sitting astride the strategic choke-points between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

It is in the military sphere where Japan has been preparing itself for the last three decades when ‘The China Threat’ was in the making. Japan being an island nation separated from China by a vast expanse of seas has no fears of any land threat where China could bring to bear the might of Chinese Ground Forces.

Japan’s threat perceptions from China primarily arise in the maritime domain as the vital sea-lanes of communication, which are Japan’s lifelines for its energy security and commerce run parallel to the long Chinese littoral resting on the East China Sea and the South China Sea in Western Pacific. China sits astride Japan’s jugular vein.

‘The China Threat’ becomes pronounced for Japan when viewed in the above context of China devoting more than 30% of its colossal defence budget in the expansion of the Chinese Navy with emphasis on submarines, major combatant ships and now aircraft carriers.

‘The China Threat’ becomes prominent for Japan in terms of China’s vast armoury of ballistic missiles, both conventional and nuclear-tipped, and China’s sizeable nuclear weapons arsenal.

Japan’s defence planning to cope with ‘The China Threat ‘essentially therefore is now focussed on achieving effective deterrence in the maritime domain, missiles threat and use of Chinese air-power against Japan. It is also focused on swift response times to military crises.

Japan today is engaged in expansion and up- gradation of its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance network, maritime surveillance and patrolling and air-defence network. The emphasis in terms of redeployments has shifted towards the South West from the earlier Northern emphasis against Russia. Expansion and upgradation of the Japanese Navy and Japanese Air Force are underway

Japan has paid serious efforts towards developing a ballistic missile shield in cooperation with the United States, new generation missiles interceptors and extending that reach through the medium of AEGIS destroyers deployed in close vicinity of China in Japanese waters.

Japan has territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku Islands which China claims. Going by China’s pattern of military aggressiveness in the South China Sea Islands disputes this is a new element in which Japan is now engaged with feverish preparations for their defence incorporating all three wings of Japan’s military. Japan has extended its military gaze to all its long line of off-shore islands stretching towards the South. 

Japan Towards New Security Horizons

‘The China Threat’ to Japan cannot be expected to decline.  In the coming decades, China intent on gambling for high stakes against United States military predominance in Asia Pacific and being a ‘strategic co-equal’ of the United States portends conflictual overtones for the security environment in the Asia Pacific and especially East Asia.

Japan cannot be expected to remain a passive spectator to such disruptive and destabilising Chinese threats to its security environment.

Japan therefore perforce would be pushed towards new security horizons to enhance its deterrence against ‘The China Threat’ in more substantial terms. The major initiatives towards Japan’s new security horizons, which I have been advocating since the beginning of the last decade, are:

• Japanese Peace Constitution needs to be revised in keeping with Japan’s security environment. Japan must now emerge as a “normal nation” and a regional power of substance without being apologetic over building its military profile.
• Japan has no other alternative but to go in for a nuclear weapons arsenal for effective deterrence against ‘The China Threat’. India too had to forgo the moral high ground in 1998 by going in for nuclear weapons tests and their possession has provided India with effective nuclear deterrence against unrestrained Chinese military arrogance and coercion. Japan too needs to go in for a nuclear weapons arsenal for the same reasons
• Japan needs to direct its vast technological superiorities towards space warfare, cyber warfare, ballistic missiles defence and nuclear submarines to provide for comprehensive security in all domains in a self-reliant military posture.
• Japan must remove restrictions on arms exports. This would generate sizeable resources for Japan’s defence build-up without a corresponding strain on the national budget

It is gratifying to note that a small stirring in this direction has already commenced in the Japanese public domain. 

Concluding Observations

‘The China Threat’ to Japan is real and promises to magnify as China starts to flex its muscles more aggressively. The lack of effective checkmating of China in the South China Sea disputes by the United States seems to have gone to China’s head.

China may get tempted to repeat the same pattern in the East China Sea on her territorial disputes with Japan. And herein would lay the rub for China as Japan is no military push-over like China’s smaller opponents in the South China Sea.

Japan has prepared for ‘The China Threat’ both singly and jointly with the United States as its military ally. In normal circumstances it would be prudent for China not to stoke fires with Japan. But China with its propensity to use military force to settle territorial disputes with its neighbours can be expected to do otherwise.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)

This Article first appeared on SAAG

The Views express by the author are his/hers alone & don’t necessary reflect those of the “PacificSentinel” Blog.

Editorial: China’s New Himalayan Thrust

Himalayan area map

By Bhaskar Roy

Recent views of some Indian experts studying China are persuading the strategic community that China is very likely to attack India in 2012. This view has apparently begun to influence some in the government, too. The underlined some is to emphasize that this is not the dominant view. But the importance of the view is to keep those in charge alert and awake.

Various reasons or evidence have been quoted to bolster this thesis. These include rapid Chinese infrastructures construction and up-gradation in Tibet which support military efficiency, high grade People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises in Tibet, possible missile back up and even the likelihood of a hard line commander or a crazy anti-India commander opening a front at some point along the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC).

There appeared to be a syndrome of looking at China’s strategic thinking through a Pakistani prism, speculating that China’s internal problems may induce Beijing to engage in confrontational military skirmish with India to divert internal pressure. This, however, is not China’s strategic culture. They close up when faced with internal political and social challenges.

It is, however, true that China in the last three years at least, has become highly assertive in its Asia Pacific neighbourhood over territorial claims. Low level skirmishes (non-military with Japan over the sovereignty over the Senkaku (in Japan)/Diaoyu (in China) Islands in the East China Sea and confrontations, especially with the Philippines and Vietnam, over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea have intensified. The issue of Taiwan’s return to the mainland is a major issue. The US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, reinforcement of US-Philippines military agreement, new US-Vietnam contacts which have military overtones are all matters of concern to China.

PLA spokesmen have been threatening military responses to establish Chinese sovereignty over these territories, though the political leadership have recognized their overreach and are trying to reduce tensions. Chinese national strategic interest in the Asia Pacific far surpasses their intentions along the Sino-India border currently. Chinese activities including military, statements from official strategic experts including from the PLA, and official media comments have refrained from threats to India.

This, however, does not mean that China has gone soft over the border issue. Not in the least. They reiterate their position periodically both officially and demi-officially.  

Tibet is being militarized aggressively. Old airports have been renovated. Advanced aircraft including SU-27 have been located in Gonga Airport along with Surface-to-Air anti-aircraft missiles. The critical railway is being extended towards the borders with India. Military exercises including ground and air force have been notable for their defensive-offensive joint operations. Most remarkable has been China’s infrastructure construction along the Sino-Indian borders especially in the Eastern Sector.

The PLA studies and simulated exercises over the years have not yielded results encouraging another military adventure against India at the moment. The first conclusion was the 1962 situation no longer obtains. The PLA’s misadventure in Vietnam in 1979 taught them that there is more to winning a war then only sheer armament power. Tactics, planning and morale of soldiers are very important.

Some PLA strategists have suggested that the next India-China war will have to be fought on the ground, air and sea – a much bigger battle concept.

The current Chinese battle doctrine is focused on winning a local war under modern conditions. From the on-going developments it is evident that its Asia Pacific Sea board and territorial claims remain the prime focus. India does not figure in this frame work.

India, however, looms much larger in China’s Asia perspective to start with. Perhaps, China’s founding leader Mao Zedong recognized India’s potential much before the Indians did. This weakness, lack of self-belief and self-confidence among Indians almost across the board, and search for peace where there is none, were handsomely exploited by the relentless Chinese propaganda machinery. It is no secret that the defeat of the Indian army in 1962 was rubbed in by the Chinese propaganda and dent the self-confidence of the Indian armed force. This also affected Indian bureaucrats and political leaders who tended to brush Chinese misdemeanors under the carpet. Recently, the Chinese are using some Indian writers to write on the 1962 war on lines dictated by the Chinese in the Chinese media.

In recent years, whenever the Indian leadership reacted strongly to an issue the Chinese backed down. But even then, appeasement of the Chinese continues. It is alleged that the formation of strike corps for the Eastern Sector was shelved a year ago allegedly in order not to provoke China. The proposal is apparently being reconsidered.   

It is evident from the recent Joint Working Group (JWG) on the border and Senior Representative (SR) level talks between the two countries that the Chinese are not willing to resolve the border issue at the moment and it does not suit them. A live border issue also gives China an instrument to needle India periodically.   

What the Chinese are doing is to buy time till they resolve the territorial issues in the Asia Pacific region in their favour. Then a more powerful China will seriously focus militarily on the Sino-Indian border, and their strength will depend on India’s capability or the lack of it. India has no time to procrastinate its military preparedness.

Chinese Defence White Papers make it clear that only strength can ensure peace and, on this basis, China’s perseverance in military modernization and preparedness.

China’s encirclement of India strategy, commonly known as the “string of pearls” strategy, an American nomenclature, has been widely discussed. Beijing, of course, denies this allegation. The strategy, however, continues but its effectiveness may have dented to an extent with India’s development including military modernization.

Pakistan, China’s fulcrum for promoting the string of pearls in South Asia may not be as effective any longer because of related developments centering on Afghanistan. But Islamabad has not been given up, though Beijing today finds that its silent support to Pakistan’s Islamic terrorist assets against India is beginning to impact China’s Muslim separatist in Xinjing. Beijing has made inroads into Sri Lanka. But the Island nation has its limitations.     

The weak links discovered by Beijing are Bhutan and Nepal. The Himalayan states and the Indo-Himalayan belt always attracted by China as soft power projections against India - winning a war without firing a bullet. It has nurtured anti-India forces in Nepal for years, taking advantage of small country antipathy against a big neighbour. India’s arrogant diplomacy periodically, only back fired. A section virulently anti-India among Nepalese politicians and media has been studiously nurtured by Beijing.

Bhutan and China do not enjoy diplomatic relationship. They have a serious border territorial issue. But official contacts are maintained to resolve the issue, while some trade takes place. But there are those in Bhutan who look at India as a hegemon controlling their life.

In fact, the 1949 Indo-Bhutan treaty virtually made Bhutan an Indian principality. Bhutan agreed to be guided by the advice of the Indian government in regard to its international relations. India’s aid made the most part of Thimpu’s budget. As the country came of age, aspirations of an independent state developed.

This was natural and in tune with the trends of the world. In the 2007 revised treaty, the above article was revised to establish close co-operation between the two countries and not to allow use of their respective territories for activities harmful to the national security and interests of each other. All reference to Bhutan’s external relations was deleted. 

This was an astute diplomatic and strategic decision from New Delhi. Bhutan was free to execute its foreign relations independently.

The next steps in China-Bhutan relations promise some interesting propositions for India-China relationship.  Bhutan’s Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinlay met Chinese premier Wen Jiabao at the Rio + 20 summit in Beijing on June 21.  This should not have been a surprise as Bhutan was encouraged by India to seek its foreign policy interests. 

More importantly, according Bhutan official website, Mr. Thinley discussed with Mr. Wen bilateral issues including Bhutan’s bid for a non-permanent seat on UN Security Council for the term 2013-14.  This was interpreted as Bhutan seeking China’s support.  But the Chinese Foreign Ministry website made no mention of this.     

Following, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister responsible for South Asia, Ms. Fu Ying was in Bhutan from August 9 to 11, for the 20th round of China-Bhutan boundary talks.  Expectedly, there was no progress in the talks with the two sides sticking to their positions.

What was important was Ms. Fuying’s speech on arrival in Thimpu.  After laboring over China’s admiration for Bhutan’s rich cultural heritage and shared history with China, she came to the specifics.  Early establishment of diplomatic relations, building bridges of friendship and cooperation, and supporting Bhutan’s international aspirations.  What should not be missed in Ms. Fu Ying’s speech are the following: (i) Bhutan was well placed to benefit from the development of China and India, and (ii) she related a Bhutanese folk tale where a partridge, rabbit, monkey and elephant forged a harmonious relationship fulfilling their wishes together.  The reference was obviously to Nepal, Bhutan, China and India.

On to Kathmandu from Bhutan on an official visit, Ms. Fu Ying told Nepal Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai that “Unity between China, India, Bhutan and Nepal could be valuable for the entire region”.  She further added “China is not India’s competitor. We want to maintain cooperative relations with India”. (The Telegraph, Nepal, August 14).

China perceives Nepal as a strategic neighbor closely tied in its security and threat calculations.  Beijing has established relations with all the major political parties of Nepal, and hoped to marginalise Indian influence in Nepal.  But the recent split in Nepal’s largest political party, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) UCPN(M), on which Beijing was banking on mainly, has disturbed the Chinese strategy.  The hardline pro-China split group calling itself CPN (Maoists) led by Mohan Baidya (Kiran) is viscerally anti-India.  Baidya visited China for ten days in July at the invitation of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department.

On his return from China (July 25) Baidya declared the Chinese leaders were worried that “federalism” in any from may lead to the disintegration of the nation and rise of foreign influence, and that was not acceptable to China.  The reference was emphatically to India.  But China is also concerned about US and European influence in Nepal who, they believe, use Nepali territory to promote Tibetan separatism in Tibet.  From China’s strategic view point, Nepal must be brought under Chinese influences to safeguard security and territorial integrity. China suspects that the USA at least is riding on India’s influence in Nepal. 

Consolidation of the Indo-Himalayan border remains a priority for China.  Beijing refused to recognize Sikkim’s accession to India till 2005 on the ground that India took over Sikkim by force.  Visiting India in 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao gave the assurance to Indian leaders that China had changed their policy, and showed a map indicating Sikkim as a part of India. But questions still remain.  Soon after Premier Wen’s India visit, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated in Beijing that the Sikkim issue will be resolved along with the boundary issue.  Official Chinese maps have not yet been published incorporating this change.

It appears China has embarked on, or testing, a new strategy without discarding the exisiting policies. Vice Minister Fu Ying’s visit has initiated a debate in Bhutan on relations with India and China.  Some feel Chinese will deliver Thimpu from international hermitage. For India, it time to lead Bhutan by hand to the international playing field following up from the 2007 amendment in the India-Bhutan treaty.

More important is the scenario that with the new template of “India, China, Bhutan, Nepal” cooperation, Beijing is not only trying bring Bhutan out of India’s influence, but also pushing itself into India’s immediate neighbourhood and sensitive relationships.

The importance of this Chinese move to India’s relations with the north-eastern neighbourhood needs no emphasis.  In the long run the Chinese move may be connected to India’s ‘Look East’ policy.  The discussions and developments on connectivity between Nepal and Bhutan with Bangladesh through Indian territory in which India is a natural participant is the making of new economic and development frame work.  It is poised to create this Asian connectivity through Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand linking South East Asia.  The project has huge potential for all the concerned countries taking India’s profile to the region claimed by China as its backyard.  Therefore, neutralizing or even balancing India among the Himalayan states will be a major success for China in containing India.

Preparing for the visible military threat from China is of high importance. The issue cannot be ignored any longer. India’s defense development and deployment is India’s business for its security.  Chinese comments, though till now mainly through these propagandas apparatus, amounts to interference in India’s internal affairs.

Notwithstanding the visible challenge, the invisible challenge is far more threatening to India’s development.  New Delhi must urgently find ways to respond.

(The writer can be reached at e-mail grouchohart@yahoo.com)

This Article first appeared on SAAG

The Views express by the author are his/hers alone & don’t necessary reflect those of the “PacificSentinel” Blog. 

Editorial: Western Pacific no longer Pacific

By Dr Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

Western Pacific as the Western half of the Pacific Ocean has never been free of major powers rivalry ever since the end of World War II. The Cold War in Europe got extended to the Western Pacific which witnessed the United States and the Former Soviet Union locked in a military tussle.

During Cold War I the United States put into place a dual strategy for the forward defence of Mainland USA, far deep into the Western Pacific. It comprised a spider-web of bilateral security alliances with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Philippines providing for US security guarantees against any Communist threat from the USSR and China. Secondly, the United States entered into agreements with these nations, excepting Taiwan, for hosting Forward Military Presence of US Forces in their territories.

This US security architecture has held firm ever since then despite the disintegration of the USSR and the fading away of the Russian threat. Only the Philippines as part of its China hedging strategy had withdrawn the facility of United States using its naval and air force bases.

In the decade when the USSR was in the last throes of disintegration, China had made significant economic progress by kind courtesy of US and Japanese foreign direct investments. In the Post -Cold War I Phase, China with a burgeoning economy had carried out rapid military modernization and up- gradation with aspirations to emerge as the dominant power in the region of the Western Pacific.

South China Sea (Click to Enlarge)

The China Threat was therefore in the making in the 1990s and fully manifested itself in the decade of the2000s. China in the pursuit of its great power aspirations had unleashed unabashedly in the second decade of the 21st Century, what can be termed as Cold War II comprising designation of Taiwan, Tibet, Xingjian and the South China Sea as China’s ‘Core Interests” meriting China going to war to protect its “Core Interests”. Military aggressiveness, armed interventions and gunboat strategies started emerging from China.

Obviously, the United States with entrenched strategic and security interests in the Western Pacific could no longer be a passive spectator The China Threat manifesting itself in multiple forms to its security and to those of its Allies in the Western Pacific who shouldered and hosted the US security architecture in this vital region.

The security environment emerging in the Western Pacific has both regional and global military implications. This also has regional and global economic implications when one remembers that the global shift of economic power to Asia has primarily arisen from China and Japan.

With the above in mind, this Paper would like to focus on the following related issues:

• Western Pacific: The Strategic Significance for the United States and China
• Western Pacific: Notable Features of the Security Environment in 2013
• Western Pacific Does Not Lend itself to Conflict Resolution
• Future Perspectives on Western Pacific Security Environment

Western Pacific: The Strategic Significance for the United States and China

The strategic significance of the Western Pacific for the United States and China lies in the geographical configuration whose notable features are as under:

• The Western Pacific rests on the East Asia littoral comprising Russia, China and Vietnam.
• Parallel to the East Asia littoral the Western Pacific run a strategic islands chain extending from the Korean Peninsula to the Indonesian archipelago.
• This island chain virtually hems in the East Asia littoral and comprises Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. Each of these also having sovereignty over outlying small islands which are now disputed by China.
• The Western Pacific comprises a number of seas. Starting from the North these are the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and the South China Sea. Moving a bit westwards is the Sea of Japan

The strategic significance for the United States of this geographical configuration of the Western Pacific emerges from the following military considerations:

• The United States is provided both an outer perimeter of defence of Mainland United States and a springboard in close proximity to China for a military intervention.
• With a combination of geographical proximity to Mainland China and the military deployments of United States and its Allies, this permits a virtual hemming-in of China in military terms.
• In this island chain configuration only a few corridors exist for the Chinese Navy to breakout into the wider Pacific Ocean.

To breakout of such a military gridlock China’s primary strategic priority should have been to sow doubts on US reliability as a security guarantor of the countries of the Western Pacific which in turn could unravel the US security architecture. China succeeded temporarily in this direction in case of South Korea and Philippines.

East China Sea (Click to Enlarge)

More significantly are the Chinese claims to islands in the South China Sea and East China Sea. This is not only determined by hydrocarbon reserves but also by the military factor that these disputed islands in China’s possession would provide China bases for deployment of its military assets as part of its area denial and anti-access strategies against US naval and air power intervention.

Such disputed islands which virtually lie astride vital sea lanes of commerce to Japan and South Korea and Western United States could be strangulated by China by deployment of long range anti-ship missiles on these disputed islands. 

Western Pacific: Notable Features of the Security Environment in 2013

The Western Pacific in 2013 seems to resemble the Cold War I security environment. The only difference being that the USSR stands replaced by China as the major threat to Western Pacific security and stability.

Further, unlike the USSR in Cold War I, which was set in a strategic tussle with only the United States at the global level, China’s strategic tussle in Cold War II manifests itself both at the global level in terms of seeking parity with the United States and at the regional level with Japan , Vietnam and other ASEAN countries.

In 2013 in military terms, China by its own aggressive and posturing has generated security disquiet in all Western Pacific countries and generating a palpable ‘China Threat” perception.

The first decade of the 21st Century witnessed The China Threat assuming dangerous contours due to US military distractions in Afghanistan and Iraq, leaving China to advance unrestrained in its military expansion.

Sensing the strategic concerns generated by China in the Asia Pacific, the United States made a riposte in the nature of the Obama Doctrine incorporating a US ‘strategic pivot’ to Asia Pacific and ‘rebalancing’ of US military postures in Western Pacific.

In 2013, the security environment in Western Pacific seems to be marked by the following:

• China’s military aggressiveness and assertiveness becoming noticeably marked in the South China Sea with ASEAN countries and with Japan in the East China Sea.
• Chinese military brinkmanship is touching dangerous levels and adding to flashpoints in the Western Pacific
• More than 30% of the colossal Chinese Defence Budget is now being devoted to build-up of Chinese naval power and force-projection assets.
• North Korea as China’s military protégé and proxy for disruptive activities in the Western Pacific is not being restrained by China
• Countries in the region can be said to be engaged in military acquisitions and modernisation as a consequence of the above.
• Japan as the pee competitor of China is now actively engaged in rebalancing its defence postures, including amending its Peace Constitution.
• The United States has gone in for a Southward realignment of its military deployments permitting better response times against any Chinese armed conflict in the South China Sea.
• Philippines is reconsidering opening the old US bases in its territory for US reactivation
• Reports also suggest that Vietnam may offer the Cam Ranh naval base to the United States.

In overall terms, such feverish military or military related activities suggest that the Western Pacific security environment in 2013 is fast emerging as one pregnant with explosive possibilities. 

Western Pacific Does Not Lend itself to Conflict Resolution

The Western Pacific very much like Central Europe in Cold War I seems headed towards congealed lines of confrontation, though this time it is more in the maritime domain.

Western Pacific military confrontations are operating at two separate planes. The first is the overall strategic tussle between the United States and China. China as the revisionist power would gamble on brinkmanship to achieve its national aspirations to be counted as a strategic co-equal of USA.

The second level is of the United States as the status-quo power sustaining its existing security architecture in the Western Pacific and now reinforcing and rebalancing it. Basically it would involve that the United States stands by its security guarantees to its Allies in the region against any armed conflict ensuing from China on their territorial disputes. This would also include the commitment of a US nuclear umbrella, in the event of a ‘China Threat’ emanating.

USN Amphibious Ready Group

In the first case, there is no ideological conflict or even any territorial dispute. It is out and out power struggle which brooks no conflict resolution initiatives. Can China as part of any conflict resolution initiative be advised to give up its global aspirations? Can the United Sates be asked that it should now cede strategic space in the Western Pacific to accommodate China's global aspirations? The answer in both cases is ‘no’.

In the second case too where US allies or its new strategic partners and friends are involved in territorial disputes with China, the latter is not receptive to any conflict resolution. China resorts to a subterfuge that any dialogue on disputes can only be bilateral in nature. Inherent in any conflict resolution initiatives is the involvement of mediators/regional organisations/multi-party mechanisms, a fact that China is not willing to concede.

On both counts therefore the Western Pacific does not lend itself to any conflict resolution. 

Future Perspectives on Western Pacific Security Environment

In terms of perspectives, the Western Pacific security environment offers no scope for optimism. On the contrary, unless there is slow-down or breakdown in the growth of Chinese economy, China’s expanding military profile both conventional and nuclear can be expected to grow.

China’s resort to political and military brinkmanship is unlikely to cease in the coming decades. Chinese nationalism is at an all-time high and is likely to grow as the Chinese regime stokes nationalism to divert attention from China’s growing domestic unrest and problems.

As China’s military brinkmanship intensifies on territorial disputes, there is an increasing likelihood of a US military intervention especially in the case where Japan is involved. The US secretary of State and the US Defense Secretary have publicly asserted to that effect.

While China can be expected to step back from an all-out armed conflict involving the United States, the reality that is likely to persist is that a Cold War template will persist in the future in the Western Pacific.

Also what needs to be noted that in terms of military perspectives any future conflict in the Western Pacific would primarily be maritime in nature to begin with. Hence the current race in the Western Pacific amongst all protagonists for build-up of naval warfare capabilities and submarines. 

Concluding Observations

In the Western Pacific intersect most intensely the strategic interests and power tussle between the United States and China. Also intersecting within this overall framework are the regional power rivalries between China and Japan and between China and Vietnam and the Philippines on the South China Sea islands disputes.

Increasingly, the United States would tend to get drawn in regional disputes between US Allies and friends with China. The United States would not be allowed the luxury of ‘strategic detachment’ from the prevailing Western Pacific security environment. It would then run the risk of witnessing the unravelling of its security architecture in the region

The United States will ultimately have to resort a containment strategy against China in the Western Pacific.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)

This Article first appeared on SAAG

Editorial: SOUTH CHINA SEA - CHINA ESCALATES BRINKMANSHIP TO DANGEROUS LEVELS

Click to Enlarge

By Dr. Subhash Kapila 

“But what about an adversary that uses ‘salami-slicing’—the slow accumulation of small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which could add over time to a major strategic change?

The goal of Beijing’s salami-slicing would be to gradually accumulate through small but persistent attacks, evidence of China’s enduring presence in the claimed territory, with the intention of having that claim smudge out the economic rights granted by UNCLOS and perhaps even the right of ships and aircraft to transit what are now considered to be global commons. With ‘new facts on the ground’ slowly but cumulatively established, China would hope to establish de-facto and de-jure settlement of its claims.”-------Robert Haddick, Foreign Policy Journal, August 03, 2012. 

Introductory Observations

The South China Sea dispute between China and its South East Asian neighbours  which has been festering for decades assumed conflictual contours since 2008-2009 after China declared it as a ‘core interest’ for China, and on which it would be ready to go to war to defend its self-proclaimed sovereignty.

China’s such assertions should not surprise the international community as it is very much in keeping with China’s past posturings and its marked propensity to resort to conflict to resolve territorial disputes rather than by conflict resolution initiatives.

Noticeably, China after 2009 has embarked on what can be best described as on a dangerous course of military brinkmanship which not only is destabilising for the Asia Pacific region but could ignite China’s military confrontation and conflict with the United States over China’s military adventurism in these contested waters.

 South China Sea disputes stand well covered in media analyses and need not be focussed in this Paper. Since China’s contentious military unilateralism and aggressiveness carries the dangers of spilling into a wider conflict what needs to be focussed on is as to why and how China feels emboldened to indulge in military adventurism over territorial disputes with its neighbors which could ordinarily be resolved through multilateral regional and international forums.

This paper therefore intends to examine the following related issues:

• China’s Escalated Brinkmanship on South China Sea Conflict: The Intended Target is the United States.
• China’s Timing of  Escalated Brinkmanship Significant
• United States Strategic Dilemma in Effectively Responding to Chinese Brinkmanship on the South China Sea Conflict
• China’s Contending Claimants Options on South China Sea Conflict: ASEAN not an Option, the Effective Option is the United States
• Global Responses to China’s Escalated Brinkmanship on South China Sea Conflict

China’s Escalated Brinkmanship on South China Sea Conflict: The Intended Target is the United States

China’s escalated brinkmanship on the South China Sea conflict can no longer be limited to China’s burning desire to garner the control of the vast hydrocarbon reserves that not only lie in the South China Sea but also in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea region. China’s disruptive strategies in the South China Sea region has now transcended onto a bigger strategic canvass, namely to checkmate the United States and assume the dominant role in Asia.

China can ride rough-shod over all its rival claimants in the South China Sea conflict with its military might any day but it will not do so as it can achieve the end result on a low-cost option by a graduated and incremental strategy which keeps the conflict boiling but yet does not boil over. In such a strategy China pre-empts a swift intervention by the United States and yet achieves its strategic objectives outlined above.

The South China Sea aggressive claims are but only a precursor for similar aggressiveness to follow in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea where it will be pitted against a more powerful rival in Japan.

However to graduate to the seas in the North, China must first attempt to get the better of the United States in the South China Sea region, both geopolitically and geostrategically

Geopolitically, China’s aims against the United States is to belittle the United States image by its seemingly inaction against Chinese military adventurism in the South China Sea region. Symbolism carries weight and the image of a helpless United States to checkmate China could be damaging for the United States.

Geostrategically, the Chinese aim is to portray to South East Asian nations that the perceived lack of strong ripostes by the United States against China arise from lack of political and strategic will on part of the United States to confront China on contentious issues. More starkly China wishes to the strategic credibility of the United States as a reliable strategic partner of Asian nations in countervailing China.

China’s three-pronged strategy outlined above is a manifestation of what in an earlier Paper I had described as China’s strategy of asymmetric attrition of wearing down US military embedment in Asia Pacific leaving the field wide open for China to dominate the Asia Pacific. 

China’s Timing of Escalated Brinkmanship on South China Sea Conflict Significant

China’s timing of escalated brinkmanship in the last few months is significant, especially as it goes against the grain of any strategic logic. China is always credited by the global strategic community as having strategic patience, long range strategic vision and that China is evolving into a responsible stakeholder in global affairs. But in the present process of China’s escalated brinkmanship on the South China Sea conflict these ingredients are visibly absent.

Then how does one make sense of its current military aggressiveness on the South China Sea conflict? China’s timing for escalated brinkmanship on South China Sea conflict can be attributed to the following factors/developments:

• China’s strategic consternation on United States strategic pivot to Asia Pacific and rebalancing its military postures in Asia Pacific. China hopes that by escalated brinkmanship on the South China Sea conflict it could deflect/disrupt United States rebalancing its military postures in Asia Pacific.
• China is seeking to impede the strategic gravitation of South East Asia nations to the United States camp and force them to arrive at strategic compromises with China by a bilateral process in which China’s political and military coercion can fully come into play.
• China senses that with the United States fully engrossed with Presidential Election year politics, the present time is opportune for exploitation of its geopolitical and geostrategic objectives stated earlier in this paper.

China has long been involved in sowing disunity amongst ASEAN nations as part of pursuance of its overall strategy to wean away Asian nations from US influence and which has a direct bearing on China’s aggressive brinkmanship posturing on the South China Sea conflict with ASEAN nations. ASEAN divisive disunity was starkly visible at last month’s ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting in Cambodia. Cambodia on China’s prodding sabotaged ASEAN unity in a glaring fashion where Cambodia indulged in a proxy war against its ASEAN member nations. 

United States Strategic Dilemma in Effectively Responding to Chinese Escalated Brinkmanship on the South China Sea Conflict

The United States is not a passive bystander to China’s escalated brinkmanship over the South China Sea conflict. Even before it enunciated the Obama Doctrine of strategic pivot to Asia Pacific, the United States had already put into motion a southward realignment of US Forces to Guam with the aim of swift responses to any outbreak of conflict in the South China Sea region.

The United States has also been refining and redefining its military doctrines specific to any military threats that China may pose in the region, in particular the Air-Sea Doctrine which is aimed at neutralising China’s Anti Access strategies .

However it seems that in terms of responding to China’s piecemeal coercive military actions against its ASEAN neighbours claimants to territories in the South China Sea, the United States is in a strategic dilemma.

The United States dilemma is best reflected in the words of the author quoted above, and he observes: “But policymakers in Washington will be caught in a bind attempting to apply this (US ) military power against an accomplished salami-slicer (China).  If sliced thinly enough, no action will be dramatic enough to justify starting a war.”

 He further observes that “A salami slicer puts the burden of disrupting actions on his adversary. That adversary will be in the uncomfortable position drawing seemingly unjustifiable red lines and engaging in indefensible brinkmanship. For China that would mean simply ignoring America’s Pacific Fleet and carrying on with its slicing under the reasonable assumption that it will be unthinkable for the United States to threaten a major power over a trivial incident in a distant sea.”

The United States however needs to recognise that historically that such trivial military brinkmanship provocations have a tendency to cumutavely add upto major flashpoints which could have been best pre-empted and nipped in the bud at the nascent stage.

Further, the United States in order not to allow its political and strategic image and stature in Asia Pacific be undermined by China’s nibbling provocations in the South China Sea region, is honour-bound to ensure that it provides the necessary security against China to its existing Allies and those whose strategic partnerships it is seeking like Vietnam. 

China’s Contending Claimants Options on South China Sea Conflict: ASEAN is Not the Option; the Effective Option is the United States

Confronting China for control of disputed islands/shoals that dot the China Sea are South East Asian countries all of which are members of ASEAN. The ASEAN grouping as an organisation had all along been trying to involve China for a dialogue on the South China Sea conflict but without success. China all along resisted that the dispute dialogue be a subject of multilateral discussions.

Additionally, the ASEAN nations, most of them were till recently adopting hedging strategies on China unsure that the United States would have the resolve to confront China on the South China Sea conflictual disputes. The picture seems to have changed after the enunciation of the Obama Doctrine.

China’s response was to inflict a divisive blow on ASEAN by proxy use of Cambodia to scuttle issue of a Communique after last month’s ASEAN Foreign Minister’s meeting in Cambodia, which would have incorporated critical references to China’s current postures on the South China Sea dispute.

ASEAN is likely to emerge as more deeply divided as China’s brinkmanship escalates on these territorial disputes. All that this bodes is that ASEAN cannot as a grouping hope to be an effective counterfoil against China on behalf of its members involved in territorial disputes with China.

Even if ASEAN was united in its stand against China’s coercion, it still does not have the military muscle to confront China. That is the stark reality.

The other stark reality for ASEAN is that China is averse to any multilateral dialogue with ASEAN grouping and this is best explained by Haddick who rightly surmises that : “ The collapse of ASEAN’s attempt to establish a code of conduct of conduct for settling disputes in the seas(South China Sea) benefits China’s ‘salami-slicing’ strategy. A multilateral code of conduct would have created a legitimate demand for dispute resolution and would have placed all claimant countries on an equal footing. Without such a code, China can now use its power advantage to dominate bilateral disputes with its small neighbours and do so without the political consequences of acting outside an agreed set of rules”

ASEAN countries confronting China on the South China Sea territorial disputes are left with no option but to strategically rely on the United States for a security cover and countervailing force against China. In doing so they would have to be ready to enter into security relationships with the United States. 

Global Responses to China’s Escalated Brinkmanship on South China Sea Disputes.

The global responses are best illustrated from a reading of speeches given at the Shangri La Dialogue June 2013 deliberations at Singapore. The common thread running through these speeches was that the global community and major powers were committed to the security of the “global commons” and to the “freedom of the high seas” and that no country had a right to declare them as national territories.

The United States, UK, and the new French Foreign Minister emphasised that all of them stood committed to the security and stability of South East Asia. The new French Government through its Foreign Minister made clear that France and European nations had a stake in South East Asia and the stability and security of the region was their strategic concern. He further emphasised that France would support any regional security grouping in the region.

China fearful of critical reference on its South China Sea posturing virtually stayed away from the Singapore annual event and sufficed it with a low level representation.

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Undoubtedly, China stalks the South China Sea as a lone ranger bent on establishing its hegemony over the South China Sea and to be followed by similar provocative posturing later on the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

Fearful of the above, China’s power rival in the region, Japan has issued some initial cautionary warnings. While China seems to be getting away with military bullying of its smaller ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea, the same walk through may not be possible for China when it confronts Japan on similar disputes up North. 

Concluding Observations

China’s recent escalated brinkmanship on South China Sea disputes with small ASEAN countries needs to be viewed as a strategic and military gauntlet flung at the United States in the nature of a challenge to provide effective United States countervailing power against China and security guarantees to South East Asia countries locked in territorial disputes with China on the South china Sea

United States responses to China’s provocations and brinkmanship are being carefully being scrutinised in ASEAN capitals and Asia Pacific capitals as eventually the success of the American strategic pivot to Asia Pacific would overwhelmingly depend on United States resolve in effectively checkmating China and before The China Threat cumulatively becomes too hot for the United States to handle.

United States declared neutrality on South China Sea disputes is no longer a viable option for the United States. The United States needs to see through the diabolical ‘Salami-Slicing Strategy” being practised by China in the South China Sea and effectively checkmate China before China prompts a United States exit from Asia Pacific.

 (The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)

Originally posted at SAAG