By David Lai
Last month’s summit appears to have changed little.
Chinese President Xi Jinping made an official visit to the United States in late September 2015 with great expectations. The top priority on his agenda was his determination to seek official U.S. endorsement of his initiative for a “new model of major-country relations” and to set U.S.-China relations on the right course accordingly. Unfortunately, given U.S. apprehension of Xi’s heavy agenda and frustrations over repeated clashes with China in the Western Pacific in recent years (even in the days prior to the summit), President Barack Obama did not answer Xi’s calls and the Chinese president returned to China virtually empty-handed.
China’s Quest for Compromise
China and the United States have had a bumpy relationship since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. In recent decades, this relationship has been complicated by a power transition process, triggered by the economic rise of China.
Power transition is a struggle among the big nations (big primarily in terms of their geography and demographics) within the international system. It is between a previously underdeveloped and disgruntled yet currently rising big nation that challenges the powerful stakeholders of the system. The struggle is about the international political, economic, and security order that reflect the values and interests of the most powerful nations.
Thucydides, the ancient Greek historian, is perhaps the first to argue that power transition carries the seeds of war. In his observation of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens, Thucydides asserted that the growth of Athenian power and the fear generated on the Spartan side had trapped the two powerful nations into a war for 27 years.
The ancient Greek tragedy is hardly the only example of this: There have been many other power transitions throughout history. Almost all ended in war. The unfolding U.S.-China power transition therefore begs the question whether it will fall into the same trap.
The Chinese argued at the outset that power transition was a Western experience, and the Thucydides Trap should not apply to China’s relations with the United States. However, Chinese leaders have gradually learned that China’s rising power is creating forces beyond their control and making the China-U.S. relations more contentious. Thus, in an attempt to ease the U.S. concern, China put forward a “Peaceful Development” call in 2003, promising not to challenge U.S. supremacy and not to repeat the mistakes made by past great powers.
On the surface, the Chinese move is a step in the right direction. However, it does not guarantee enduring and positive China-U.S. relations forever, as areas of contention have continued to trouble the two nations. In a 2013 meeting with Obama at the Sunnylands Resort, California, Xi took the Peaceful Development promise a step further, turning it into a guideline for U.S.-China relations (and for other big nation relations as well). Xi’s initiative has three action codes: China and the United States should strive for 1) no confrontation, 2) mutual respect for core interests, and 3) win-win cooperation.
Read the full story at The Diplomat