By Greg Austin
The new push for realism in exercises.
Ever since China got a bloody nose in its invasion of Vietnam in 1979, the leadership has struggled to come to terms with managing the spectrum of military activity from normal training to use of force. The lack of sophistication was evident in its use of ballistic missile launches against Taiwan in 1995 and 1996. Both cases said as much about the politics within China’s leadership about the use of force as they did about its capacity to use military power in pursuit of political goals.
The 2013 White Paper titled the “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” shows a leadership more attuned to the spectrum and how to manage it. The 2015 White Paper, China’s Military Strategy, represents a clear evolution of China’s sophistication in understanding the conflict management spectrum. It places a premium on “enhancing realistic training”: “The PLA will continue to attach strategic importance to combat training in realistic conditions” and “The PLA will continue to conduct live-setting training.” An analysis by Gary Li for the Jamestown Foundation in February 2015 gives us an excellent overview of the poor state of PLA training, and the interest of the leadership in it since 2013. He refers to a decision of the Central Military Commission in 2014 on “Recommendations Concerning the Improvement to the Realism of Military Exercises.” The article provides useful insight into the training facility at Zhurihe.
This provides context for the reports from China and Taiwan in July about the building of a mock-up of the Presidential Palace in Taipei at the Zhurihe training base and its use in combat training. The background above also helps us to understand why the PLA or its political commissars might have wanted to show the attack scenes on Chinese TV.
Read the full story at The Diplomat