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| MGR-3 Little John (XM47) Tactical Nuclear Weapon (Image: Wiki Commons) |
By Christine M. Leah
Could tactical nuclear deterrence help prevent conflict in an Asian maritime context?
With the South China Sea becoming increasingly contested by most regional states, and the United States asserting its freedom of navigation in the area, the chances of conflict seem less and less remote. China has been testing the boundaries of its provocations by building up a series of artificial islands and – just recently – deploying military capabilities on them. This is taking place against the backdrop of a massive and sustained build-up in sea-denial capabilities, including aircraft carriers, submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and reports of the People’s Liberation Army managing to MIRV its DF-5 ICBM. In addition, the Chinese have raised new concerns about South Korea and Japan’s participation in the U.S. ballistic missile defense program. There are more and doubts about the size and shape of the North Korean nuclear arsenal. All these factors mesh together to create an environment in which the U.S. nuclear arsenal has a very important role to play.
One of the problems with U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is that, although Europe may have gotten rusty on its nuclear strategy 101, U.S. allies in Asia never even got to touchthe book. Since Europe was more important, East Asia only got the “leftovers” of U.S. capabilities and doctrine. But now it is clear that the Asian landscape is just as important, if not more, than Western Europe today, to the global strategic landscape. And nuclear weapons will have a role in containing the prospects for a conflict between China and the U.S.
However, there is almost no literature on the tactical use of nuclear weapons at sea.
“Tactical” nuclear weapons are, after all, an essential part of the credibility of deterrence and, therefore, extended deterrence. There are two notable exceptions: Desmond Ball and Linton Brooks. But their work was premised on the Cold War context of confrontation, with scenarios between the U.S. and USSR. There was much less work devoted to what a U.S.-China nuclear scenario in and of itself might look like. Might it be more acceptable to use nuclear weapons at sea? Could the exchange be limited? How would a nuclear confrontation terminate? Geography means the scenarios and concepts developed for Europe may be largely inapplicable to the Asian maritime context.
Read the full story at The Diplomat