By Franz-Stefan Gady
China’s Foreign Ministry voiced “strong opposition” to a recent DoD assessment on Chinese military strength.
Yesterday, my colleague Ankit Panda provided a useful summary of the recently released annual U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress on China’s military and security developments (see: “What the Pentagon Thinks of China’s Military”).
In his article, Ankit notes that the paper contains an interesting discussion of China’s alleged “low-intensity coercion” (aka “salami slicing”) in the South and East China Sea, particularly the use of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), PLA ships, and its commercial fishing fleet to advance its own territorial claims.
In detail, the paper states that Beijing “uses a progression of small, incremental steps to increase its effective control over disputed territories and avoid escalation to military conflict.” Additionally, next to an increased naval presence,China applies the following means to advance its territorial agenda in disputed areas, according to the Pentagon:
China has (…) used punitive trade policies as instruments of coercion during past tensions, and could do so in future disputes. For example, through trade tariffs, tourism restrictions, and limits on foreign direct investment.
The report lays out a short summary of such Chinese retaliatory trade restrictions, including a 2012 fruit import ban imposed on the Philippines during the height of the Scarborough Reef tensions, or the restrictions on exports of rare earth minerals to Japan “following tensions over a collision between a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese patrol ship.”
Read the full story at The Diplomat