By Prashanth Parameswaran
Some say Beijing may be adjusting its approach. But history suggests caution is warranted.
Given the litany of surprises we have witnessed in the South China Sea over the past few years, it would be a fool’s errand to make grand predictions about what we might see in 2015. Nonetheless, there has been a flurry of discussions over the past few months among the chattering classes about whether we are likely to see a change in China’s approach to the South China Sea in 2015, and the implications that would have for Southeast Asia and beyond. It is worth briefly considering whether this may indeed occur and what it would signify.
Since Xi Jinping’s ascension to power, we have witnessed China employ what I would call a strategy of “incremental assertiveness” in the South China Sea. That incremental strategy approach has two parts, often pursued together in a calibrated manner. The first part is to change facts on the water in China’s favor where possible to advance its claims as set out in the infamous nine-dash line. The range of activities could range from land reclamation activities in the Spratlys to outright seizures of features as occurred before with the Scarborough Shoal. But the real emphasis here is on working incrementally, such that no single action is egregious enough to draw the United States into a conflict or unite ASEAN claimants with Washington against Beijing, but all of them combine to shore up China’s position further down the line.
The second part is to simultaneously continue to cement economic ties with Southeast Asian states in order to draw them closer into China’s orbit. Doing so not only advances China’s own objectives of economic development and regional leadership, it also makes ASEAN states think twice about challenging Beijing on the South China Sea. This strategy has the added utility of perpetuating divisions within ASEAN between those who are more pliable to Beijing’s wishes, such as Cambodia, and others who are less so. Keeping ASEAN divided is crucial to advancing China’s preference for resolving disputes bilaterally rather than with ASEAN as a whole. That is why, to take just one example, Beijing has isolated the Philippines in the past for its very public filing of an arbitration case at The Hague while it has praised Malaysia’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach.
Read the full story at The Diplomat