By Paul J. Leaf
To play a productive role in a tense neighborhood, Tokyo needs to look beyond constitutional interpretations.
Facing growing Chinese and North Korean threats plus an increasingly distracted and underfunded U.S. partner, Japan is freeing itself of historical military constraints to better provide for its security. Japan’s path is promising, but it does pose potential risks.
Japan’s constitution was enacted in 1947 while it was occupied by the Allied forces in the wake of World War II. Japan committed gross atrocities during that war, including killing and forced labor of millions of war prisoners and civilians, sexually enslaving women, conducting lethal human experiments, and torture. The U.S. therefore insisted that Japan’s constitution include pacifist provisions. Most notably, Article 9 of that document renounces war, outlaws the use and threat of force to settle international disputes, and relinquishes the right to maintain armed forces.
Since its inception, Article 9 has been stretched. After World War II, Japan had only occupation troops and a small police force to protect it. By 1950, when those troops shifted to fighting the Korean War, Japan was essentially defenseless. Four years later, Tokyo therefore created a quasi-military: its Self-Defense Forces. Japanese law required these military forces, among other things, to maintain a strict defensive orientation and to refrain from deploying overseas and co-developing weapons with other countries. These limits eventually eased. With more than 240,000 active personnel, about 400 fighter jets, three pseudo aircraft carriers, sixteen submarines, and forty-seven destroyers, the Self-Defense Forces can project offensive power outside Japan. Its missions have expanded beyond Japan’s own security needs. For instance, Japan sent the Self-Defense Forces to Iraq for reconstruction purposes. And in 2011, Tokyo began jointly producing arms with Washington.
Still, until recently, the Self-Defense Forces remained subject to serious limitations. Among others, Japan could not practice collective self-defense. For example, despite a U.S.-Japanese alliance, Tokyo’s defensive posture barred it from shooting down a North Korean missile in Japanese airspace if that missile targeted the U.S. rather than Japan. Additionally, Tokyo banned arms exports.
However, the security environment has deteriorated in recent years due to growing threats and at least the perception of eroding U.S. defense commitments. Since 2006, North Korea has tested three nuclear weapons, potentially developed nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking Japan, and has killed South Korean troops and civilians.
Read the full story at The Diplomat