By John H.S. Åberg
China is not a revisionist power, but the recent air intercept indicates revisionist orientation
The recent incident involving an armed Chinese Su-27 fighter conducting a dangerous intercept of a U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft has provoked much debate, especially here in The Diplomat. Zachary Keck argues that Chinese pilots are not rogue, and that the actions are consistent with Chinese foreign policy objectives, while, in turn, despite the intercept, Robert Farley argues that China is just an assertive status quo power. Jin Kai states that the P8 intercept signals “China’s bottom line” and is a matter of restating its core interests, yet without being related to the pivot or the “new type of great power relations.” Moreover, here, here, and here a raging debate goes on concerning who’s to blame and whether U.S. surveillance or China’s intercept represents the unlawful act of this drama. So how do we bring these threads together?
China is not a revisionist power, but the intercept indeed indicates revisionist orientation; the intercept is a matter of China’s core interests, and the “new type of great power relations” needs to be included in the analysis; and notwithstanding the quarrels about international law, the intercept was an act of deviance going against established norms of interaction.
The dichotomous understanding of countries as either status quo powers or revisionist powers is flawed. Status quo and revisionism are analytically useful in terms of foreign policy orientations that are pursued at certain times, at certain locations, and in certain issue areas and functional areas of order. Therefore: China is not a revisionist power, but the P8 intercept indicates revisionist orientation. This particular revisionist orientation concerns the regional security order. Whether in the form of Asian security for Asians by Asians as expressed by Xi Jinping or in the form of disapproval of the U.S. broker and leadership role in the South China Sea disputes, the political performances of the Chinese leadership explicitly pronounce a preference for revising the regional security order. Yes, preferences are attitudinal, not behavioral. But overt preferences are revealed in actual choice situations. The intercept was one such situation.
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