By Amit R. Saksena
India’s policy of deterrence may be exacerbating regional tension instead of preventing conflict.
Since its initiation by the Prime Minister’s Office in 2003, India’s nuclear doctrine, for all official purposes, has revolved around the doctrine of credible minimum deterrence (CMD). However, the recent developmental strides in missile technology made by the Defense Research and Development Organization (including the Agni V, BrahMos and Dhanush missiles) raises a question: Just how much is a “credible minimum?”
History will tell us about the perceived Chinese threat, which was the catalyst for India to test its first nuclear device in 1974. However the 1998 tests, conducted under the auspices of the newly instated BJP government, were more in line with regional prestige than with national security. This was also New Delhi’s hamartia(mistake). A threatened Pakistan, already on the fast-track to nuclear weapons, responded by testing its own devices, thus turning an already fractious region into one of the world’s most dangerous. As a counter, India’s leadership, still riding the wave of “peaceful nuclear explosions,” drafted a hurried and unplanned nuclear doctrine, which has since been subjected to ridicule.
A nuclear doctrine is primarily a containment strategy, as opposed to a standard operating procedure. When CMD was first found to be in tandem with New Delhi’s “peaceful objectives,” policymakers had to choose which of their two belligerent neighbors would be the focus of India’s nuclear posture. Unsurprisingly, China was expected to fill that role. However, given events already underway, India is now faced with an even greater threat in the form of a nuclear Pakistan, complete with a first use, India-centric nuclear strategy. New Delhi’s rhetoric of no first-use (NFU) notwithstanding, India is the catalyst for the arms race now underway for nuclear supremacy in the region, as it is practically impossible to gain “credible minimum” deterrence against both of its geopolitical opponents. China’s nuclear power, far surpassing India’s own, would require much more extensive measures and a larger arsenal to be credibly deterred. And this development would be anything but minimal with respect to Pakistan’s nuclear portfolio. To catch up to China, India will constantly be challenging Pakistan to an unintended nuclear defense dilemma.
Read the full story at The Diplomat