By Ankit Panda
U.S. foreign policy will need to react flexibly and creatively to possible outcomes in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
As the United States’ planned deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan fast approaches, the situation on both sides of the Durand line is far from optimal. In Kabul, presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah just boycotted the hard-brokered power-sharing deal and audit that temporarily defused a broader crisis over the future of Afghanistan’s democracy. In Islamabad, Nawaz Sharif’s democratically elected government is under siege from Imran Khan and his supporters. For the United States, everything is not going to plan in the perpetually troublesome “Af-Pak” region.
In Washington’s ideal scenario, Afghanistan’s presidential palace would have had a new occupant by this time, who’d have been settled in and acclimated to the demands of running Afghanistan. This person would have presumably signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), thereby eliminating a great deal of ambiguity about the United States’ future role in Afghanistan (both candidates in the run-off, Ghani and Abdullah, have said that they would sign the BSA if elected). With Pakistan, Washington has gotten somewhat used to never having an ideal state of affairs, but it at least expected Nawaz Sharif’s government to maintain order and rein in the military. Neither has proven true.
Read the full story at The Diplomat