By Michael Green and Jeffrey W. Hornung
What the critics don’t understand about Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation.
On July 1, the Japanese Cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe approved a proposal to reinterpret Japan’s constitution to end the ban on allowing its military forces to exercise the right of collective self-defense (CSD). The move widens the set of options available to Japan’s military, called the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) which, in turn, has sparked opposition from both domestic and international sources. Much of this opposition, however, fails to appreciate the nuance to the change and therefore, what the change actually engenders. Instead, critics of CSD are basing their opposition on myths about the change. The ten most egregious are debunked below.
Myth 1: The roles and missions of the SDF will fundamentally change.
One major mistake in media coverage of the Cabinet decision on CSD is that it will fundamentally change the role of Japan’s SDF. While the specifics of the change will depend on legislation to be introduced in the Diet beginning this autumn or perhaps next spring, the proposed change essentially makes it possible for the SDF to come to the aid of other allies or like-minded countries if they come under attack. However, three conditions apply that significantly constrain when CSD can actually be exercised. These conditions are: 1) The situation should pose a clear threat to the Japanese state or could fundamentally threaten the Japanese people’s constitutional right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; 2) There is no other way to repel the attack and protect Japan and its people; and 3) The use of force is limited to the minimum necessary. As such, while the CSD policy change will allow Japan’s SDF to do something that it has not previously done, the conditions under which it can be exercised are still very restrictive. Japan’s policy will still be based on the decades-old metric of minimal force necessary for exclusively defensive defense (senshu-boei). Moreover, the major role of the SDF in the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain logistical support and defensive missions such as missile defense or anti-submarine warfare. CSD will allow tighter integration with U.S. forces, but not necessarily a fundamental change in the roles and missions each military currently fulfills.
Read the full story at The Diplomat