By Zachary Keck
Though left unsaid, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan figured prominently into Tokyo’s reinterpretation of Article 9.
Ankit and I were joined on the podcast this week by Clint, our Tokyo-based editor and residential Japan expert, who runs the new Tokyo Report blog. Not surprisingly, the topic of discussion or the podcast was Japan’s reinterpretation of Article 9 of its constitution to allow for collective self-defense.
As is probably clear from listening to the podcast, there were slight disagreements on a couple of issues between Ankit and Clint on the one hand, and myself on the other. First, I felt that the purpose of the reinterpretation was to finally provide Japan with the inherent right to collective self-defense as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Clint assured me that the reinterpretation was aimed at being much more limited.
Having the chance to read up more on the subject, I am unsurprised to learn that Clint was correct (after all, he is our resident Japan expert). First, unlike Article 51 which provides nations with the inherent right to come to the aid of allies even if the states themselves are not directly threatened, the reinterpretation of Article 9 only allows Tokyo to come to the defense of allies if it can be tied directly to its own defense. As the vice president of New Komeito, LDP’s coalition partner, Kazuo Kitagawa explained: “Collective self-defense under international law means defending other countries without considering if that would infringe on one’s own security, but we see this as part of the self-defense of Japan.”
Second, because of pressure from New Komeito, the revision doesn’t explicitly give Japan the right to collective self-defense, but rather says that some actions that are permitted could be construed as collective self-defense.
Read the full story at The Diplomat