By Wei Zongyou
China and the US need to make another grand bargain and transform the regional security order.
Originated in the aftermath of World War II and modified in the early 1970s, the current East Asia security order is primarily based on two pillars: The reconciliation between China and the United States in 1972, and the bilateral alliance treaty system established in the early 1950s. The former pillar ended the animosity and Cold War between the continental China and maritime U.S., while the latter served as a guard against the Soviet threat and a reassurance against any potential threat China may pose in the future. The reconciliation and the ensuing engagement with the outside world led to more than thirty years of unprecedented, continuous economic growth in China, dramatically changing the power architecture in East Asia. Meanwhile, the treaty system has guaranteed the stability and openness of the maritime order in East Asia and U.S. maritime hegemony in the Western Pacific.
Nevertheless, this order is not without its shortcomings. Basically, it suffers from four flaws. First, the reconciliation between China and the United States was not based on common values or ideological affinity, but on a common anti-Soviet interest. It therefore lacks a solid foundation and is vulnerable to exogenous influences. Once the common threat from the Soviet Union evaporated, relations between China and U.S. were always going to be at risk of souring due to obvious differences in values, political systems, and cultures, and indeed this did happen in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War.
Second, the bilateral alliances were aimed at containing China when they were established in the 1950s. Even though the Soviet Union became the main target after the reconciliation between China and the U.S., China never disappeared entirely from the radar. Since the collapse of Soviet Union, China has once again loomed large in the alliance calculations.
Third, the East Asia security order as modified in the 1970s is a bifurcate order, with China as a continental land power in East Asia, and the U.S. as a maritime power in the Western Pacific. What East Asian security lacks is an integrated order that links both the continental land and the littoral area surrounding East Asia. Lastly, once China turns its attention to the sea and transforms itself from a continental power into a dual continental-maritime power, avoiding conflict with the U.S. and reconciling their respective interests will become serious challenges.
Read the full story at The Diplomat