 |
| Image: Flickr user The White House |
By Jin Kai
The U.S. needs to clarify its Asia-Pacific strategy if it is to be more than a temporary fix for declining leadership.
We have been discussing the relative decline of the U.S. and the rapid emergence of China, and the consequent increase in uncertainty or even the probability of war. Naturally, the incumbent dominant power is especially concerned about the behaviors of emerging power, as the confrontation between the U.S. and China during the recent Shangri-La Dialogue has shown. However, there is another issue that needs to be addressed: the ambiguity of the U.S. “rebalance to Asia.”
First, let’s refer to George W. Bush’s “war on terror” as a contrast. However much this policy cost the U.S., it had a very clear and firm stand, very clear goals, an extensive range of partners, and isolated target enemies. What’s more, although the U.S. has paid tremendous costs both economically and militarily, in general the front line of anti-terrorism has been successfully pushed away from the U.S. homeland. The goals of such policies have been achieved, even though they also sparked criticisms.
More significantly for the Asia-Pacific region, this strategy enabled the U.S. to win cooperation from all possible states, including rapidly rising China. Hence, the Sino-U.S. relationship successfully avoided enduring troubles and direct confrontations, and both sides maintained a wide range of strategic cooperation on issues like anti-terrorism. Under Bush, the U.S. continued the policy of “constructive engagement” with China that had begun in Bill Clinton’s administration, expanding the number of cooperative mechanisms and channels of communication between the U.S. and China.
By contrast, the goals of the “rebalance to Asia” have been vague. The U.S. has repeatedly emphasized that “rebalance” does not aim to contain China. Yet, from the perspective of the U.S., the existence of an “imbalance” in Asia-Pacific region has been brought about exactly by the rapid emergence of China. So, if the goal of the “rebalance” is not to contain China, what is it? Obviously, the U.S. has yet to successfully convince China on this point.
Read the full story at The Diplomat