By Amitai Etzioni
The U.S. should not treat its Asia commitments as distinct from its role in the Middle East.
Many observations about the Near and Far East view them as if they were worlds apart. Thus, the U.S. pivot is typically understood to entail moving forces, funding and attention from one region to another. Some U.S. warships, we are told, are to be moved from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, and some Marines from Afghanistan to Australia. More generally, the pivot is reported as involving a withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan and strenuously avoiding engaging in the Syrian civil war, while simultaneously forming new military alliances with Vietnam, seeking a return of U.S. forces to the former Naval Base Subic Bay in the Philippines, and clarifying that the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security extends to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In short, curtailing U.S. commitments and involvement in the Near East and extending them in the Far East.
Actually, there is a profound link between the two theaters: namely whatever takes place in the Middle East greatly affects what takes place in Southeast and East Asia. The more the United States turns out to be a fickle, unreliable ally of its longstanding friends in the Middle East—especially Saudi Arabia and Israel—the more the leaders of South Korea and Japan will worry whether they can rely on the United States’ defense umbrella. Similarly, the more Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain must worry about the backing of the U.S.—the more Vietnam and the Philippines are likely to worry about being trampled as the elephant and tiger rumble.
Read the full story at The Diplomat