Rahul Bhonsle
The past one month has seen substantive summit level engagement between India and three key members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the United States, Russia and China. In many ways this is the major power bloc in global polity that is set to take the place of the traditional P 5 of the UNSC. Without undermining the status of the other two P5 members, France and UK, it may not be out of place to suggest that India may be a natural member on the high table though not acknowledged as such but due to its emerging position in geo-politics. Thus while it may take some time for India to be a permanent member of the UNSC bilateral summits as the ones that were held between India and United States, Russia and China in September and October would outline the significant positions that the principal states will take on geopolitical issues.
From the bilateral point of view as well a review of the relations through the dialogue held during the Summits and the joint statements issued would provide a perspective on the respective points of views of India as well as the other three countries. This will also enable measurement of the differences in the relations between India and the United States, Russia and China.
In general the summits would indicate the vast differential in relations qualitatively between the three countries and India. Quite obviously no two relations are the same and would reflect the depth as well as the longevity of engagement between countries. While India and Russia have had a strong relationship that goes back to many decades, India and the US are expanding their engagement since 2000 and thus it is more of a 21st Century relationship with limited legacy. On the other hand with China being a neighbor with shared boundary which is disputed, there is a need for resolution of some of the contentious issues which reflects in the relations as such and is a major point during any India China summit level interaction where confidence building on the boundary issue will form an increasingly important component.
Given the depth of understanding between India and Rusisa there is far greater congruence on global and regional issues than that with the United States. Thus whether it is with reference to Syria, Iran or Afghanistan India and Russia have a common approach. This may not be the case with the United States whereas with China both countries tend to have different national interests that reflect in their positions particularly with reference to Afghanistan.
At the same time from the people to people point of view with almost 2 million plus people of Indian origin in the United States there is momentum to the relationship that emanates from the grass roots with support systems and associations that go beyond the government. A similar glue so to say may be missing with Russia and obviously with China. Similarly with the United States there is a commonality of language, English that acts as a facilitator whereas in the case of Russia and China, this acts as a barrier. This was more than obvious during the recent joint exercise Indra held at the Combat Group level between India and Russia in October where language came up as a barrier for closer operational integration.
While there is a tradition of an annual summit between India and Russia, held alternately in Moscow and New Delhi, this is more of a transactional issue with the United States as well as with China. Yet with China there have been two summits this year in May and October reflecting the necessity felt by both sides for closer alliance in views after the new Chinese leadership of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang has assumed the mantle in Beijing.
India Russia concluded the annual summit on 21 October 2013, a somewhat early appraisal of relations which has been normally taking place in the month of December. Missing in the engagement was a substantial element of defence technical cooperation as the 13th meeting of the Russian-Indian Inter-Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation is yet to take place. Normally this is held before the annual summit thus the follow up is far more substantial. This year it appears that the absence of India’s Defence Minister Mr A K Antony in September-October due to domestic political compulsions and hospitalisation may have prevented the Commission meeting before the annual summit. The meeting is now scheduled in November coinciding with handing over of the Gorshkov nee Vikramaditya to the Indian Navy.
The India US summit on 27 September appears to be one held at the initiative of the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh who is seen to be in the last leg of his second tenure given the elections being held in India in early 2014 where the ruling Congress Party is facing a strong anti incumbency wave. Thus it was somewhat of a farewell visit for Dr Manmohan who had also been regarded as someone who has been actively behind expansion of Indo US relations particularly by fostering the Indo US Civil nuclear deal in his first tenure, where he was willing to face the axe so to say as the Bill faced major resistance in the parliament and had to be put to vote. At the same time the US administration was keen that the India US defence technology cooperation be ratified by Dr Manmohan Singh and thus the summit was important from this perspective.
The India China summit on the other hand was important due to firstly need for establishment of a close rapport between the Indian and new Chinese leadership towards that end while Dr Man Mohan Singh and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang had met in June in New Delhi, a meeting in Beijing along with President Xi Jinping was important. More over recent challenges faced on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as the India China boundary is known necessitated expansion of confidence building measures between the two sides and towards that end, a high level meeting was felt necessary.
This Article first appeared on Security Risks and is reposted here under a Creative Commons license.