By MANPREET SETHI
Since Pakistan announced the first test of the 60-kilometer Nasr ballistic missile in 2011, there is an implicit assumption in Western writings that India will respond to the Pakistani move toward tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) with similar weapons of its own.
However, this is precisely what India’s response should not be, and is unlikely to be, if the country and the rest of the international community correctly read the signals from Rawalpindi.
The primary task of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is not to deter India’s nuclear weapons but to avoid having to engage a superior military capability. Pakistan believes that its low nuclear threshold constrains India from militarily punishing it.
India, meanwhile, maintains there is space to fight a conventional war despite nuclear weapons. The concept of limited war, a series of quick cross-border strikes whose objective would not be to occupy Pakistani territory but to deliver a punishing blow, has been conceived in this context. This alarms Pakistan because if India can tailor a conventional response to remain below its red lines, then its nuclear weapons fail in their objective.
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