By Robert Farley
The Diplomat has hosted some interesting recent conversations about strategy, conversations that intersect with my own interests on the relationships between military institutions and strategic effect. “Strategy” is a notoriously slippery term that often seems to serve simply as a blunt rhetorical (PDF) instrument. Nevertheless, it might help to try to break down how air, sea, and land forces have traditionally conceived of the relationship between strategy and victory. My starting point is that strategy should be about constraining, to the greatest extent possible, the voting rights of the enemy.
Historically, airpower has employed an assertive definition of strategic decision. Classical airpower theorists (such as Giulio Douhet (PDF), Billy Mitchell, and others) viewed strategic airpower as the capacity to destroy enemy state capacity without destroying the enemy’s fielded military forces. Strategic air attacks against cities would either induce state collapse by undermining the confidence of the population, bring about the collapse of the organized military, or some combination of the two. Neo-classical airpower theory (most notably in the form of John Warden’s “Five Rings” theory) held much the same view, with some sophisticated tweaks.
Read the full story at The Diplomat