By J. Michael Cole
There’s no doubt that China’s Dong Feng 21D (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) is, in theory, a formidable anti-access weapon. Since its alleged deployment circa 2010, many defense analysts have argued that the so-called “carrier killer” would be a game changer in any armed conflict in Northeast Asia and prevent the participation of U.S. carrier groups in regional contingencies, such as war in the Taiwan Strait. But is the missile really that much of a threat, or is all the hype part of an asymmetrical campaign by China to defeat its enemies without a fight?
If last week’s statement (PDF) before the Senate Armed Services Committee by Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael T Flynn is any indication, the U.S. military is buying into the capabilities of the DF-21D. The unclassified version of Flynn’s annual threat assessment even states that China has augmented its 1,200 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan with “a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21D.”
But ever since the People’s Liberation Army then chief of general staff General Chen Bingde gave the first official confirmation in July 2011 that the PLA was developing the DF-21D ASBM, specifics about the missile have been few and far between, with officials refraining from discussing the program in detail. For the most part, the hype has been the result of reports in Chinese media, which were subsequently picked up by Western outlets and analysts — including the missile’s alleged maximum range of 2,700 km, which, it was later found, had been an erroneous addition by editors at the China Daily. Later assessments (PDF) by the U.S. Department of Defense set the missile’s range “in excess of 1,500 km.”
Although some analysis have posited that the lack of information given by Chinese officials about the DF-21D may stem from efforts to downplay the threat and thereby disincline U.S. and regional powers from developing effective countermeasures, the reverse could also be true. It is worth exploring the possibility that the DF-21D is an asymmetrical weapon whose utility is unrelated to whether the system has reached “initial operational capability.” In other words, the ASBM doesn’t have to be fully operational to meet China’s strategy of anti-access and area-denial within its sphere of influence.
Read the full story at The Diplomat