By Robbin Laird
Pundits tend to forget that the 21st century is not the 20th repeated. As much as the US competition with a rising China is framed as a reprise of the Cold War with the Soviets or of the Pacific war with Japan, the game has changed.
The rise of China changes the opposing player. The limits of US power projection across the Pacific changes how we can play the game. The opening of the Arctic changes the shape of the board. And America's key allies in the Pacific are not the same as those of the 20st century.
Any US-China rivalry in the Pacific really revolves around who has the most effective allied strategy, and whether or not the US delivers what allies are looking for, which is American presence, engagement, and effective capabilities to assist in deterring China and deflecting of Chinese efforts to dominate the region.
The allies are always forward-deployed. When joined with an enduring presence mission for the US projection forces, they provide a powerful foundation for scalability of US and allied forces. And with the United States providing strategic depth, reach-back to an integrated and networked force is inherently possible.
Presence, scalability, and reach-back are solid foundations for the kind of deterrence necessary in the evolving strategic environment in the Pacific.
The challenge for the US is to shape approaches and systems which can plug into what allies themselves are doing. In effect, the US needs to shape a lynchpin strategy, which gives allies the maneuver space to deal with China.
We have interviewed many leaders and analysts in the Pacific to determine what the evolving orientations below the surface are in dealing with the new Pacific dynamics, China, maritime and trade security and the Arctic, among others.
Certainly, a key point is that the Chinese are simultaneously the main trading partner and the main threat to many of our allies. Shaping a strategy that can deal with both realities is a sine qua non for success in the region, both for our allies and us.
The intersection of the defense of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Singapore forms a quadrangle of key US allies in the region. The US is directly or indirectly involved in the defense of all four corners of the Quadrangle, and the evolution of their capabilities individually and collectively is crucial to the evolution of American capabilities and strategy in the decade ahead.
In the next piece, I will deal with South Korean defense because it is so crucial to how the US could re-shape its Pacific engagement and presence strategy. For now, I am going to deal with three key allies: Japan, Singapore and Australia.
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