By Ankit Panda
Most observers of the geopolitical transformation of the Indo-Pacific in the 21st century so far have dwelled on the ascendance of Chinese power, regionally and globally. At the same time, Asia’s two largest democracies—and second and third largest economies respectively—Japan and India have strategically converged. This behavior is consistent with the expectations of every major theory of international relations. For the proponents of political realism, the behavior is a natural effort by each state to expand relative power and navigate a security dilemma with China. For the neoliberals, India’s vast economic potential in the early-2000s promised gains for Japanese firms and interests. For those who would emphasize identities in the explanation of state behavior, India and Japan share common liberal-democratic values, and India remains one of the few powerful states in the Indo-Pacific arc without historical grievances against the Japanese.
Regardless of why it occurred, this alignment will have important consequences in the region, and certainly in any power transition involving the United States and China.
Indeed, the two countries have undergone a major strategic rapprochement since 2000. In 1998, Japan was quick to condemn India for the Pokhran-II nuclear tests. By 2008, however, the two referred to each other as “Strategic Global Partners” as per their 2006 Strategic Global Partnership, and have concluded a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. Bilateral trade volumes were negligible in the 20th century whereas today the two states enjoy a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that liberalizes bilateral economic activity, and eases Japanese activities in a country often perceived by OECD countries as highly regulated and hostile to foreign investment. Since 2006, India and Japan have held annual Prime Ministerial level talks—a privilege afforded by each to no other state (in Japan’s case, even the United States).
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