By Eddie Walsh
The Diplomat is running a series of interviews with Washington DC-based ambassadors on defense, diplomacy, and trade in the Asia-Pacific region. Last month, Washington Correspondent Eddie Walsh filed the first part of his interview with Ambassador Kim Beazley of Australia. Following is the second part of the discussion, on defense, diplomacy, and trade issues in the Asia-Pacific region from the Australian perspective.
ANZUS recently celebrated its 60th anniversary. To remain relevant, the terms of the treaty must be regularly updated to account for the changing security environment. For example, the Australian and U.S. governments announced earlier this year that a cyber attack on either nation would trigger the treaty. However, some say there are larger questions to be answered than just what new threats fall under the treaty. There are issues of strategic responsibilities and shared costs which can't be overlooked. So, from your perspective, what is the current state of ANZUS? What more needs to be done to modernize the treaty, and how is Australia responding to America’s call for its allies to contribute more to global security within the context of ANZUS?
Most people – Australians included – have a fixed view of the American-Australian alliance. ANZUS is just part of the relationship – a sort of boilerplate document that underpins it all. So, there's a sort of assumption that it was there in 1951 and it's the same now. It isn't. It changes constantly. It changes quantitatively in the characteristic of the relationship between the two countries and the things they do together. It also changes geo-politically as the area that Australia inhabits alters in terms of importance to the United States.
One of the reasons it took so long to get ANZUS in place from 1945-51 across successive Australian governments was because the South Pacific was no longer relevant to the United States once World War II was over. The focal points of the Cold War were already relevant by the end of the 1940s. The global political system of the Cold War had as its focal points Europe, North Asia, and to a degree the Middle East because of oil. Particularly after the Vietnam War, the Nixon Doctrine assumed not much importance to Southeast Asia and none at all to the South Pacific. So, the zones of fascination to Australia were barely important to the United States.
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