By: Michael S. Chase
The modernization of China’s nuclear missile force capabilities has led a number of analysts to ponder the question of “how much is enough” for China. Some have speculated that China may take advantage of the declining numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals to “rush to parity” with the nuclear superpowers. Others have even argued China already could have secretly amassed a much larger number of nuclear weapons than is widely believed, apparently basing this conclusion largely on their interpretation of the motives behind China’s large-scale construction of tunnels to support Second Artillery Force (SAF) operations (Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2011; “China’s ‘Underground Great Wall’ and Nuclear Deterrence,” China Brief, December 16, 2009). No compelling evidence has been provided to support these assertions, however, and several analysts have shown that they are based on questionable sourcing and flawed research (Asia Security Watch, January 9; Federation of American Scientists, December 3, 2011). Nonetheless, Chinese nuclear force modernization is real in both quantitative and qualitative terms. As the latest Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China indicated, China is moving toward a larger and more survivable force consisting of silo-based and road-mobile ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
These force modernization developments should come as no surprise. China has long sought an assured retaliation capability, though for many years China lived with a relatively modest and potentially vulnerable nuclear force [1]. More recently, however, China has been modernizing its nuclear forces in pursuit of “effective” nuclear deterrence, a requirement that can be traced to Chinese military publications such as the 1987 edition of the authoritative book, The Science of Military Strategy. More recently, China’s national defense white paper in 2006 described China’s nuclear strategy as requiring a “lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs” but official Chinese sources provide little in the way of specifics with regard to how many nuclear weapons or what type of force structure is required to meet this objective (State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2006). Non-governmental experts in the United States estimate China currently has a few hundred nuclear warheads [2]. Given China’s lack of transparency, however, analysts must draw their own conclusions about how many nuclear weapons Beijing believes will be enough to allow China to achieve its deterrence objectives in the future.
The writings of Chinese strategists shed some light on this problem in that they suggest quite strongly that China will continue to modernize and expand its nuclear missile force These same strategists, however, see little benefit to be gained by amassing thousands of nuclear weapons in an attempt to achieve parity with the United States and Russia. With respect to its nuclear missile force, China has shown determination to maintain the secure, second-strike capability that is required to ensure that it will have a credible strategic deterrence force—even in the face of advances in adversary ISR, precision strike and missile defense capabilities. Yet the writings of Chinese strategists strongly suggest going much beyond what is required for an unquestionably credible assured retaliation capability would lead to diminishing returns at best and strategic instability at worst. For example, Major General Yao Yunzhu of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), a prominent analyst of nuclear issues, argues China adheres to the views of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, who clearly believed “deterrent effectiveness does not increase in proportion with numbers of nuclear weapons,” but rather that “a survivable and invulnerable small arsenal can be equally effective in terms of deterrence” [3]. Along similar lines, Sun Xiangli argues the experience of the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War shows the pursuit of a “war-fighting” strategy “does not substantially increase the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.” Moreover, because it requires a very large nuclear arsenal, it consumes “substantial economic and technological resources.” Worse still, Sun argues, large arsenals and “war-fighting” strategies lead to strategic instability and increase the risk of nuclear war [4].
Assessments such as these appear to reflect the longstanding views of senior leaders. As a recent article based on Chinese military publications and the memoirs and selected works of key figures in China’s nuclear weapons programs points out, “Chinese leaders have believed that nuclear weapons were basically unusable on the battlefield and that once mutual deterrence was achieved, a larger arsenal or arms racing would be costly, counterproductive and ultimately self-defeating” [5]. China thus is unlikely to attempt to exceed the United States or Russia in terms of the number of nuclear weapons it deploys. Nonetheless, there is ample reason to believe Beijing will increase the size of its nuclear arsenal as needed to ensure that it maintains an assured retaliation capability in response to perceived security challenges. This could result in substantial increases to the quantity and quality of China’s nuclear arsenal.
Read the full Article at The Jamestown Foundation