Editorial: North Korea's Middle East Pivot

By Zachary Keck

North Korea has a long history of funneling weapons to Palestinian and other Middle Eastern militant groups.

Over at China Power, Shannon notes that Beijing is reluctant to get deeply involved in the Middle East. China’s client state in Pyongyang, however, appears to be much less apprehensive.

According to Con Coughlin, the Defense Editor at the London Telegraph, Hamas and North Korea are currently negotiating an arms deal to resupply the Palestinian militant group with missiles it has lost during its current conflict with Israel.

“Security officials say the deal between Hamas and North Korea is worth hundreds of thousands of dollars and is being handled by a Lebanese-based trading company with close ties to the militant Palestinian organisation based in east Beirut,” Coughlin reports.

The report, which cites unnamed Western security officials, says that the deal is reportedly for hundreds of missiles and communications equipment. It also claims that Hamas has already provided a down payment on the weapons. 

Read the full story at The Diplomat

Editorial: Japan Sanctions Russia Over Ukraine

By Ankit Panda

New Japanese sanctions against Russia lower hopes for a resolution to the Kuril Islands dispute between the two countries.

Japan announced that it will impose greater sanctions against Russia over its actions in Ukraine, including support for the anti-Ukrainian government separatists that are accused of shooting down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17. This answers one of the questions Zach and I briefly discussed on The Diplomat‘s Asia Geopolitics recently: would Japan jeopardize the diplomatic progress made between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin on potentially resolving the long-standing Kuril Islands dispute in order to bring its policy towards Russia in line with that of the United States and Europe? A consequence of Tokyo’s decision to continue to sanction Russia is that the Kuril Islands territorial dispute between the two countries, which appeared to be heading towards a bilateral diplomatic resolution earlier in Abe’s second term, will likely be shelved for a different era in Russia-Japan relations.

According to the Associated Press, Japan will freeze the assets of “individuals and groups supporting the separation of Crimea from Ukraine” and restrict imports from Crimea. Japan will additionally freeze funds for new projects in Russia in line with the policy of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The sanctions are yet to be officially endorsed by Shinzo Abe’s cabinet but that decision is expected later this week. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga called on Russia to help resolve the conflict in Ukraine: ”We urge Russia to exercise influence over separatist groups in Ukraine so that they will cooperate in the international probe into the Malaysia Airlines shoot-down,” adding that ”Japan truly hopes that the Ukrainian situation will be resolved as soon as possible through diplomatic dialogue.” 

Read the full story at The Diplomat

Editorial: China Holds Annual Military Drills in East, South China Seas

By Shannon Tiezzi

The PLA is holding live fire exercises off China’s southeastern and southern coasts.

China Military Online reports that the People’s Liberation Army will carry out live-fire drills in the East China Sea from July 29 to August 2. In preparation for the drills, the Chinese government issued a navigation notice banning maritime vessels from entering an area of the East China Sea bordering southeastern Zhejiang province, roughly 200 kilometers north of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. AXinhua report reposted by China’s Ministry of Defense described the exercises as “routine training.”

Meanwhile, China is also holding military drills in the south. Bloomberg reports that China is “holding live-fire drills” in the Gulf of Tonkin. Though the drills are reportedly part of an annual exercise, the scope of this year’s exercises is larger than previous versions. Ni Lexiong, a defense researcher at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, told South China Morning Post  that such large drills in China’s eastern coastal region were uncommon, and likely intended as a warning to Japan. 

Read the full story at The Diplomat

Editorial: Is China Threatening or Defending the Postwar Regional Order?

By Jin Kai

China believes that it is defending, rather than upsetting, the post WW2 regional order.

The international community and a number of major Western media outlets have constantly questioned China’s role in the Asia-Pacific region as the country continues its rapid emergence. A popular view describes China as a violator of or threat to the regional order. For example, shortly after China declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, an article in The National Interest talked about “China’s war on international norms” and denounced China’s “unilateral attempt to alter the regional status quo.” Such articles imply that China is a threat to the regional order.

Meanwhile, China has been trying to present itself as a defender of the postwar regional order. For example, during Premier Li Keqiang’s first government work report (delivered to the National People’s Congress in 2014), he included a new reference to China’s determination to “safeguard the victory of World War II and the postwar international order.” More recently, as this Saturday marked the 69th anniversary of the Potsdam Declaration, Chinese media took advantage of the opportunity to revisit the end of World War II and the new regional order that emerged after the war. These reports, like one in Xinhua, describe the Potsdam Declaration as “an important document which helped establish international order after World War II.” The articles argue that Japan is violating the Potsdam Declaration and thus the postwar international order in important ways (for example, by pursuing remilitarization). China’s opposition to these moves, then, makes China a staunch defender of the postwar order.

These differing media analyses from China and the West pose a fundamental question: Is China a threat to or a defender of the postwar regional order in East Asia? 

Read the full story at The Diplomat

Editorial: Will the Islamic State Spread Its Tentacles to Pakistan?

By Arif Rafiq

Despite talk of Pakistan militants swearing allegiance, so far at least the threat seems overstated.

The shocking spread of the Islamic State group (formerly the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) over Sunni dominated areas of Iraq and its declaration of a caliphate last month has sparked speculation that the group will replace al-Qaeda as the vanguard of the global jihadist movement. Indeed, there is concern that Pakistani jihadist groups, especially the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, the principal anti-state jihadist group), could pair up with the rising ISIS, rejuvenating itself as an insurgent force. But such concerns, while not completely unfounded, are exaggerated.

To recognize the caliphate of the Islamic State Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the TTP would have to defect not only from al-Qaeda’s ranks, but also sever its nominal (but important) ties with the Afghan Taliban. The costs of such a shift for the TTP currently outweigh the benefits. Though Al-Qaeda has been weakened in Pakistan by U.S. drone attacks and Pakistani military and intelligence operations, it remains an anchoring force for local anti-state jihadist groups, providing them with a broader strategic vision as well as technical expertise. Al-Qaeda has an established supply line of Pakistanis from outside the tribal areas, including urban areas, built over the course of more than a decade. It has effectively fused with elements of the anti-Shia Lashkar-e Jhangvi, which is deeply tied to the TTP. The Islamic State has yet to even remotely approach what al-Qaeda can offer Pakistani jihadist groups.

The indications so far are that Pakistani jihadists are wary of getting involved in the dispute between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Earlier this year, a prominent Pakistani jihadist forum shut down a discussion thread on the Islamic State’s clashes with al-Qaeda’s Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. And in early March, a contributor to the forum claimed that he spoke with Adnan Rashid – a senior TTP commander since arrested – who allegedly said that his group supports neither the “fitna”(internecine strife) in Syria nor the Islamic State group.

According to the Telegraph, the Tehreek-e-Khilafat, a previously unknown jihadist group supposedly based in Karachi, said that it swore allegiance to Islamic State’s al-Baghdadi. But the story has little credibility. It was reported by a journalist with a tabloid bent and has gained little traction in Pakistan’s Internet jihadosphere. 

Read the full story at The Diplomat

Editorial: HADR and US-China Military Cooperation

By Jen Pearce

It is time for the two powers to work together on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been a significant contributor to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) in Asia. The geographic region known as the Ring of Fire, which stretches from Christchurch, New Zealand up to the Bering Strait, down the Pacific Coast of the United States, and to the southern tip of Chile is disproportionately prone to natural disasters.  The Southeast Asia region of the Ring, in particular, is beleaguered annually by typhoons, volcanoes, earthquakes, and tsunamis. The United States has offered various forms of humanitarian assistance to the nations of the Asia-Pacific for decades; however, it was not until after the end of the Cold War that United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) began to conduct large-scale HADR missions. Since 1989, the United States military has led the charge in nearly every major disaster in Southeast Asia.

China is geographically the largest country in the Asia-Pacific region. It is also home to the world’s second largest economy and the world’s third most powerful military. As it expands its regional and global influence, it rattles the nerves of its neighbors. In recent years, many in the leadership in China have expressed desire for a bipolar world, with the United States controlling the West and China managing the East. However, there is a gap in how China perceives itself and how it projects itself. A greater presence on the world stage also demands a larger and more comprehensive responsibility toward global affairs.

When arguing for China’s increased participation in disaster relief efforts, it should be stressed that the United States should not scale back its own capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. In addition to providing first-responder capabilities in times of crisis, the United States military also serves as a constant presence that encourages regional stability. Tensions in the region are arguably higher than they have been in decades, with skirmishes over territory occurring often and increasing in frequency. Preemptively, the United States positioned air and naval assets in and around the South China Sea long before China became a regional power. These assets, many of which have been in place since World War II, have been a fairly effective deterrent to regional conflicts. However, greater cooperation and shared responsibility for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief in the region would be to the benefit of all countries involved. An increased role by China would serve to benefit China, the United States, and its neighbors. 

Read the full story at The Diplomat

Think Tank: The Great Asia Bargain fades and falls away

By Graeme Dobell

In 1972, Nixon and Mao met in Beijing to begin the Great Asia Bargain. Nixon called it the week that changed the world. The Republican and the Revolutionary ushered in a glorious period.

Almost as an aside—a prelude to the geopolitical plotting—they launched an economic engagement that turned China into the phenomenon of the modern age. As the man who took the US dollar off the gold standard, Nixon started a process that will see the yuan become a global currency to equal the greenback. Talk about unintended consequences. And that was just an aside.

Look back at what Mao and Nixon wrought because of what Shinzo Abe’s is now doing. Making Japan a security power—even claiming Japan’s right to be a ‘super power’—marks the demise of an important residual element of the Bargain.

Think Tank: China’s response to Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation

Author: Amy King, ANU

On 1 July 2014, Japan’s Abe government announced a major change to the country’s post-war security policy by effectively lifting the ban on collective self-defence. The Abe government introduced new legislation that reinterpreted Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, thereby permitting Japan to use military force to come to the aid of an ally or a country in a close relationship with Japan when it is under armed attack.

China’s response to Japan’s reinterpretation of the constitution has been predictably negative. The official Xinhua news agency described the changes as a ‘brutal violation’ of the spirit of Japan’s pacifist constitution, while the Chinese Foreign Ministry in more muted tones suggested that constitutional reinterpretation raised doubts about Japan’s commitment to peaceful development.

In the weeks since the Abe government’s announcement, two themes have become particularly notable in Chinese official and academic commentary.

Think Tank: Abe strikes a delicate balance in Australia

Author: Thomas U. Berger, Boston University

Today, Japan finds itself in a remarkably difficult diplomatic and domestic political situation. While Japan continues to be secure from any existing external threat, the rise of a nuclear North Korea and an increasingly powerful and assertive China are creating major challenges for Japanese security policy.

A serious issue is the stand-off with China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. For the first time in the history of the US–Japan alliance, it is Washington — not Tokyo — that is worried it might be dragged into a conflict in which it has no concrete interests. Tokyo must deter China from escalating the confrontation, while also reassuring the United States (and other countries Japan hopes to cooperate with on security affairs) that it is a reliable partner.

In addition to these diplomatic issues, domestically, Japan is beset by a host of social and economic problems which have been exacerbated over the past two decades by a political system that is prone to paralysis.

Think Tank: East Asia’s geostrategic equation and Japan’s collective self-defence

Authors: John Blaxland, ANU and Rikki Kersten, Murdoch University

Given that Japan is a mature democracy and has been a positive force for global peace and stability for the past 70 years, why is it so controversial that the country wants to possess more ‘normal’ military capabilities?

Japan is one of the top military spenders, ranked 8th globally by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and spends between US$48 billion and US$50 billion on defence per year. Japan has leveraged its high-tech commercial industries to develop a self-defence force that — although untested in combat — is capable of employing potent military force.

The United States has long been interested in seeing Japan adjust its self-defence policy to enable it to participate more robustly in alliance activities. In 2005, Australians had to operate alongside the Japanese task force deployed to southern Iraq because constitutional provisions precluded them from using force. Today, that kind of embarrassing dependence on others is increasingly unacceptable to Japanese conservatives.