Editorial: India to Lease Another Nuclear Submarine From Russia

Image: Wiki Commons

By Franz-Stefan Gady

New Delhi and Moscow are slated to sign a contract in December.

The Indian Navy will lease another nuclear-powered submarine from Russia, TASS reports. The 10-year lease agreement will likely be signed at the Russian-Indian summit in December, according to a source at India’s Defense Ministry.

India’s Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar will meet Russia’s Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu next week in Moscow to discuss details.

“Parrikar will hold talks on this strategic project with his Russian counterpart Sergey Shoigu. After the ten-year contract is signed another two or three years will be required for upgrading the submarine in keeping with India’s requirements,” the source toldTASS.

The Russian submarine likely to be handed over to the Indian Navy will be the KashalotK-322 nuclear-powered attack submarine (NATO classification Akula II-class), a ship that has served in Russia’s Pacific Fleet since early 1989 and is currently under repair.

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Editorial: Evaluating India-Africa Maritime Relations

Indian Navy Frigate - INS Teg

By Abhijit Singh

Partnering Africa requires that India work with it in the maritime realm.

On October 26, leaders of 54 African nations gathered in New Delhi for the third edition of the four-day India-Africa Forum Summit – an event billed in the Indian media as India’s most ambitious outreach program towards Africa. On the eve of the high-level conclave, reports indicated that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposed launch of “a new era of India-Africa relations” included a plan for the comprehensive development of Africa’s littorals. In keeping with India’s expanded focus on Africa’s maritime economic potential, commentary in the media suggested, the Indian government was keen to formalize a wide-ranging maritime partnership.

Indeed, the past few years have witnessed a reorientation in India’s nautical outlook towards Africa. With increasing emphasis on developing maritime relationships with Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Seychelles and Mauritius, India has reached out to African states through offers of greater military aid, capacity-building and training assistance. With its economic engagement in the African continent growing rapidly, New Delhi has also sought to widen its sphere of influence in the Western Indian Ocean. In a display of a more purposeful maritime diplomacy, Indian naval ships have increased their port visits to Africa’s East coast and smaller Indian Ocean island states.

Yet, India’s essential approach to maritime cooperation has revolved around anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. While it has provided security assistance to small island states in the Indian Ocean (undertaking regular patrols in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Mauritius and Seychelles, carrying out hydrographic surveys, even providing assistance in the establishment of a coastal radar network) the Indian Navy’s larger security initiatives have been animated by the need to safeguard energy and resource shipments in the waters off Somalia. Consequently, India’s most significant achievement in Africa has been the naval escorting of more than 3000 merchantmen since 2008, in the pirate-infested waters off the Horn of Africa.

Not surprisingly then, India’s security role in the Africa’s continental littorals has struggled to move beyond the set parameters of anti-piracy collaboration. With Indian naval ships constantly involved in collective maritime patrols in the Gulf of Aden and the East African coast, capacity building efforts – in terms of the provision of security and surveillance assets and critical technology to African navies and coast guards to help them perform basic constabulary functions – have remained rudimentary.

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Editorial: What’s Behind Indonesia’s South China Sea Rhetoric Amid US-China Tensions?

By Prashanth Parameswaran

Observers need to look past the words of a few to understand Indonesia’s approach.

Over the past few days, much ink has been spilled about Indonesia’s rhetoric on the South China Sea disputes as the United States finally conducted a freedom of navigation operation near China’s artificial islands there.

While paying attention to what the world’s fourth largest country thinks is important, observers would do well to look beyond the words of a few individual officials to get a sense for Indonesia’s South China Sea approach.

A case in point was the brouhaha over the comments of Luhut Pandjaitan, one of Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s top advisers. On Tuesday, according toKyodo News, Pandjaitan said that Indonesia disagreed with the U.S. “power projection,” equating the move with ineffective wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To some, such comments make it seem like Indonesia’s South China Sea position is slightly anti-U.S. – perhaps even pro-Chinese – and that Jakarta may not view Chinese assertiveness there with much alarm. In fact, that could not be further from the truth.

Pandjaitan’s exact comments, which were given offhand in response to a few reporters, ought not to be viewed as an official articulation of Indonesia’s South China Sea policy, which I have detailed at length previously (See: “No, Indonesia’s South China Sea Approach Has Not Changed”). More generally, parsing comments by individual Indonesian officials makes for good headlines but is a bad way to assess policy change because of the diversity of views that can emerge even within a few weeks. Indeed, just last week, Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu made the news when he suggested in Beijing that that if regional countries can manage the South China Sea on their own, “there’s no need to involve other parties in resolving the dispute.”

A less hyperbolic and more authoritative and comprehensive version of Jakarta’s approach was what Jokowi himself said in prepared remarks at the Brookings Institution, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, while on his inaugural trip to the United States. As fate would have it, Jokowi wound up speaking just hours after the FONOP had occurred. As I reported for The Diplomat, Jokowi said that while Indonesia was not a South China Sea claimant, the country has an interest in the preservation of regional peace and stability (See: “Indonesia Calls for South China Sea Restraint Amid US-China Tensions”). He implored all sides – not just the United States – to exercise restraint. He also said tensions in the area must be defused through peaceful means based on international law and that China and ASEAN should make progress on a binding code of conduct (CoC).

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Editorial: Grounded - Taiwan’s US-Made Attack Helicopter Fleet is Rusting Away

A AH-64 Apache Helicopter Gunship (File Photo)

By Franz-Stefan Gady

Taiwan’s tropical climate may be too much for the AH-64E Apache gunship to handle.

The Republic of China Army is currently investigating the grounding of the majority of its AH-64E Apache “Guardian” attack helicopters purchased from the United States, Taipei Times reports.

The aircraft’s manufacturer Boeing has also dispatched a special task force to help identify the cause of the technical difficulties, which could be due to Taiwan’s “wet and high humidity climate, seasonal monsoon rains blowing salt-laden ocean water inland, or improper maintenance and handling by ground service crew,” according to the media report.

Major General Huang Kuo-ming, commander of the Army Aviation Special Forces Command, stated that nine helicopters had to be grounded due to serious oxidation on metal components, which was discovered in the helicopters’ tail rotor gearboxes- made of a new aluminum-magnesium alloy.

“We noticed rust corrosion developing in the tail rotor gearbox in March, and notified the US side of the problem at that time. They were quite concerned, and have advised our side to apply several remedial measures to counteract the corrosion,” Huang said at a news briefing this week.

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Editorial: US Fighter Jets Intercept Russian Aircraft Approaching US Aircraft Carrier

USS Ronald Reagan

By Franz-Stefan Gady

The U.S. Navy scrambled four fighter jets to intercept two Russian warplanes in waters off the Korean Peninsula.

Two Tupolev Tu-142 aircraft flew within one nautical mile of the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, prompting the dispatch of four F/A-18 Super Hornets from the Reagan to intercept the Russian warplanes, AFP reports. The Reagan was sailing off the Korean Peninsula at the time of the incident.

The Tu-142 aircraft were flying at an altitude of 500 feet approximately one nautical mile away from the aircraft carrier, which was operating in international waters in the Sea of Japan as part of a joint U.S.-South Korean naval exercise.

A naval vessel escorting the Reagan attempted to contact the aircraft but did not receive a response. This led to the sending of the F/A-18 Super Hornets fighter jets from the Reagan’s flight deck to intercept and escort the Tu-142s –”standard operating procedure,” according to the U.S. Navy.

The Tupolev T-142 is a maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft. It is derived from the Tu-95, which, along with the Tu-160, constitutes the current backbone of Russia’s long-range and strategic aviation.

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Editorial: Top US, Chinese Naval Officials Meet to Discuss South China Sea Tensions

By Ankit Panda

Top officials from the U.S. and Chinese navies will meet to discuss recent tensions in the South China Sea.

Admiral Wu Shengli, the current commander of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN), and Admiral John Richardson, the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, will hold an hour-long video conference on Thursday, two days after the United States sent a guided-missile destroyer within 12 nautical miles of a Chinese artificial island in the South China Sea, to discuss current tensions in the region.

The meeting will be the first high-level interaction between U.S. and Chinese senior military leaders over tensions in the Spratly Islands since the patrol by the USS Lassen on Tuesday, October 27. The USS Lassen, accompanied by P-8A Poseidon and P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft, asserted high seas freedoms within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands.

The conversation between Wu and Richardson will focus on the freedom of navigation patrol and on related issues. China’s Ministry of Defense notes that Wu will present China’s “solemn position on the U.S. vessel’s entry without permission,” echoing language used by the Chinese foreign ministry. According to Reuters, Thursday’s video conference will be the third of its kind between the top officers of both the U.S. Navy and the PLAN.

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Editorial: US-China - No More Spy Games?

By Sameer Patil

Are the U.S. and China working to create norms in cyberspace?

On September 25, the United States and China agreed to contain their industrial or economic cyber espionage activities against each other. This is the first instance of two major cyber powers reaching common ground on norms of state behavior in cyberspace.

The agreement, reminiscent of the United States-Soviet Union arms control accords of the Cold War era, is important because industrial or economic cyber espionage has been a thorny issue in the U.S.-China relationship since the early 2000s.

Although traditional espionage—the collection of state secrets—is an accepted part of statecraft worldwide, the U.S. government has repeatedly tried to distinguish between such spying and economic cyber espionage. And it has repeatedly accused China of engaging in economic espionage through cyber attacks against American companies to steal intellectual property and commercially valuable data such as corporate strategies, product designs, business negotiations, and dual-use technology-related data.

The U.S. has often cited China’s alleged theft in the mid-2000s of data related to F-35, the stealth fighter aircraft, as a prime example of China’s economic and military cyber espionage. According to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), China repeatedly breached the computer networks of American government and private defense companies to steal data about design and radar modules for the F-35, and incorporated it into its own stealth fighter aircraft, the J20.

Attacks like these have cost the U.S. Department of Defense $100 million, mainly in costs for rebuilding networks. The repeated attacks have also potentially increased the cost of the $98 million-plus F-35—an escalation that affects the export potential of the fighter aircraft, since it is being jointly developed with the U.K., Israel, Italy, Australia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Turkey.

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Editorial: Can the US and China Cooperate on the First (and Last) Line of Cyber Defense?

By Franz-Stefan Gady

Deeper China - U.S. CERT cooperation will be beneficial for both countries.

Earlier this month, I noted that the recent agreement between China and the United States to cooperate on a number of cyberspace-related policy issues, including an understanding on intellectual property theft, would, in all likelihood, not lead to a reduction of the number of cyberattacks ostensibly launched from Chinese territory.

A new report issued by the U.S.-based cybersecurity company CrowdStrike appears to confirm my previous analysis, since it outlines that attacks by Chinese “state-affiliated” hackers (a rather vague term) on U.S. technology and pharmaceutical companies have continued unabated from the time the agreement was announced until now.

This is not surprising. After all, the agreement did not specifically prohibit all cyberattacks and the collection of information via cyberespionage, but rather called for an end to the passing on of information extracted from U.S.-private sector networks to Chinese companies in order for them to gain a competitive advantage. It may be too premature to argue that the agreement has failed.

For now, the September 2015 China-U.S. cyber agreement remains the most useful framework for bilateral cooperation on cyber-related policy issues after the June 2013 Sunnylands summit pledges to deepen cybersecurity cooperation were abandoned with the U.S. indictment of five Chinese military hackers in May 2014.

To avoid past mistakes, the rather vague September agreement needs to be followed up as soon as possible by bilateral meetings to more clearly define specific venues of cooperation between China and the United States.

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Editorial: Beware the Fatal Flaws of Britain's China Strategy

By John Hemmings

The UK’s approach to Beijing, while hardly surprising, suffers from several fatal flaws.

Chinese President Xi Jinping received the reddest of red-carpet treatments in London last week, with Xi being treated to a 21-gun salute, a royal carriage ride down the Mall, an address to both Houses of Parliament, followed by a State Banquet at Buckingham Palace and a visit to the Prime Minister’s official residence Chequers.

The fact that British Prime Minister David Cameron used the full powers of the British state to welcome the Chinese leader has many wondering about the future of UK-China ties as the two proclaim a new “golden era” of bilateral relations, and agree to create a “global comprehensive strategic partnership.”

While many in London question the timing – this year Beijing mismanaged a stock market slump while simultaneously tightening control over dissidents – the Treasury attitude is simply to bulldoze the new China approach through other departments of government, including a skeptical Foreign Office. The visit and the assumptions it’s based on raise questions about Britain’s tactical understanding of China. After all, as Evan Medeiros, former senior staffer on Asia on President Obama’s National Security Staff, told the Financial Times, “if you give in to Chinese pressure, it will inevitably lead to more Chinese pressure.”

The seemingly ‘new’ mercantilist approach of Chancellor George Osborne is deeply embedded in historical traditions of British foreign policy-making, and has run parallel and sometimes counter to Britain’s values-oriented foreign policy. Long before Henry Kissinger said it, Lord Palmerston claimed that Britain had no “permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests.” Britain has always viewed trade as one of these permanent interests, since power is derived from economic standing. This is evident throughout the last century: the UK was the largest source of long-term foreign direct investment in the United States, played a pivotal role in Japanese industrialization, and was one of Germany’s main trade partners prior to both the first and second world wars. If the new China policy is a mistake, Britain has made it before.

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Editorial: Philippines v. China - Court Rules Favorably on Jurisdiction, Case Will Proceed

By Ankit Panda

China’s nine-dash line will have its day in international court.

On Thursday, October 29, the Permanent Court of Arbitration awarded its first decision in the The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China. The court ruled that the case was “properly constituted” under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, that China’s “non-appearance” (i.e., refusal to participate) did not preclude the Court’s jurisdiction, and that the Philippines was within its rights in filing the case. In short, Thursday’s decision means that the Permanent Court of Arbitration rules in the Philippines’ favor on the question of jurisdiction. With the jurisdictional issue resolved, the case can move forward to evaluating the merits of the Philippines’ legal assertions in the South China Sea.

In a press release, the Court noted that the decision was “unanimous” and “concerns only whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the Philippines’ claims and whether such claims are admissible.” Notably, the Court has rejected an argument in China’s position paper that the “2002 China–ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea constitutes an agreement to resolve disputes relating to the South China Sea exclusively through negotiation.” The Court has decided that the Declaration on Conduct was a “political agreement that was not intended to be legally binding.” This may influence the already lethargic process between China and ASEAN toward a binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.

As the Court prepares to consider the merits of the Philippines’ claims, it’s worth revisiting what exactly Manila is seeking a decision on. As Jay Batongbacal succinctly outlined over at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative earlier this year, Manila is looking for the Court to decide on four primary questions.

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