Think Tank: Offshore balancing, US retreat and strategic disorder

Rod Lyon

John Mearsheimer’s and Stephen Walt’s recent Foreign Affairs article advocating a return to offshore balancing is certainly generating a debate amongst the doyens of US foreign policy. Tom Switzer, for example, clearly likes their arguments. Dan Drezner doesn’t. So perhaps I ought to begin by outlining my own position. I accept the starting point for the Mearsheimer/Walt argument: the strategic mainstream is starting to fracture as America reprioritises its domestic agenda. But I don’t accept that offshore balancing—a strategy under which the US stays ‘offshore’ from Eurasia for as long as possible and, even when it comes onshore, makes its allies carry as much of the weight as possible—would lead to favourable outcomes for either the world or America.

Despite the Mearsheimer/Walt argument that ‘by husbanding US strength, an offshore-balancing strategy would preserve US primacy well into the future’, I don’t see how international observers would perceive offshore balancing as anything other than US retreat. And those perceptions would, in turn, fundamentally weaken the credibility of US security assurances to allies and partners. Critics would paint it as the waning of the Pax Americana, and not entirely without reason.

Think Tank: Offshore balancing - a tutorial for Trump

Image: Flickr User - lokern jahre

Tom Switzer

Great sea changes of foreign policy thought are rare in American public life. But there’s abundant evidence that the US is experiencing one now.

Polls show that the American people are tired of the world, with a majority believing that it’s high time for the nation to concentrate on its own neglected internal problems. The defence budget has fallen and will continue to fall, and there’s a strong aversion to seeing US soldiers killed and wounded. To the extent that such views prevail, they’re inimical to the post-Cold War consensus that the US should impose its will and leadership across the globe.

Enter Donald Trump, whose divisive rhetoric and rude-and-crude behaviour shouldn’t disguise the fact that he has caught the significance of the new mood. Like Bernie Sanders, Trump found a receptive primary campaign audience whenever he questioned America’s propensity for promoting democracy and subsidising allies’ defences. And, unlike Hillary Clinton, he recognises that US military interventions in the Middle East all too often make a bad situation worse, getting America bogged down in sectarian wars while radicalising a new generation of jihadists.

Editorial: The Case for the Centuryfortress: Defining the B-52J

Image: Flickr User - PACAF

By Col Mike “Starbaby” Pietrucha

“With a well-considered upgrade plan, the B-52 can serve to its 100th birthday.”

The long rifle was the great weapon of its day … today this B-52 is the long rifle of the air age. -Gen Nathan Twining, March 18, 1954

It seems increasingly likely that there will be a B-52 flyby for the retirement of both the B-1 Lancer and the B-2 Spirit. The venerable bomber, which first flew in 1952, remains the primary component of the USAF’s bomber force for both nuclear and conventional missions. Lacking the stealth of the B-2 and the speed of the B-1, the B-52 remains a frontline combat aircraft because of its exceptional range, unmatched versatility, and flexible payload options. It is debatable whether today’s aviation industry could re-create an airplane with this essential mix of capabilities, but a fully modernized B-52, in combination with the new Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), would provide the USAF with an asymmetrical advantage over both China and Russia that neither is likely to match. Far from being obsolete, the Stratofortress could well serve into the 2050s, making an updated bomber well worth the effort and expense, and ushering in the B-52J Centuryfortress – the 21st century bomber.

Background 

Oddly enough, it is the substantial increase in the military capabilities of both Russia and China that make the B-52 an attractive prospect again. China’s pursuit of a comprehensive anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capability has not only resulted in a threat to air operations, but a threat to airbases as well. China has over sixty military airfields just in the four military districts closest to Japan and Korea, some of which are hardened to a standard that no U.S. base has ever achieved. Matched against this are six U.S. fighter bases in Japan and Korea. All of the potential U.S. fighter bases are subject to overwhelming attack by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and combat aviation from a country that has more missiles, more aircraft, and the ability to rapidly and overwhelmingly mass effects against very few fixed U.S. targets. Combined with a major investment in ship-killing missiles, including the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (the first of its kind), Beijing has the ability today to make it very difficult for the U.S. to operate aircraft or surface combatants in China’s front yard.

From a tactical standpoint, China clearly intends to negate the U.S. investment in air dominance by attacking the weak points presented by dependence on nearby airfields. This is a deliberately asymmetric strategy that offsets the fighter-heavy approaches preferred by the USAF and the only remaining carrier-based option for naval aviation. The Chinese target analysis is easy – if they inhibit the ability of the U.S. to fly aircraft and dock ships, then the U.S. will be effectively neutralized in the western Pacific.

The obvious response to this strategy is for the U.S. to engage in some asymmetry itself, including a number of options which entail fighting from a distance. In the old European model, where NATO and Warsaw Pact air forces squared off over compact territory, speed, survivability and maneuverability were the attributes that largely described the utility of combat aircraft, which reinforced a trend towards fighter aircraft. In the Pacific, with its long distances and island bases, the key attributes are range, sensor capability and payload, which are typically attributes of the bomber. For operations over long distances, the combination of penetrating bomber (LRS-B) and standoff platform (B-52J) could provide a formidable combat capability by the mid-2020s.

Read the full story at The Diplomat

Editorial: Why China Will Base an Aircraft Carrier Near the South China Sea

Chinese Navy Aircraft Carrier Liaoning (File Photo)

By Shannon Tiezzi

The real reasons China is so interested in the South China Sea.

In July 2015, the Canadian-based, Chinese-language Kanwa Defense Review reported that China had finished building its second aircraft carrier base. The first base is in Dalian, in northern Liaoning Province; the new base, the larger of the two, is reportedly based in Sanya, on Hainan Island off China’s southern coast.

According to details of the report, which was picked up by Chinese media outlets, the base has a large pier that could accommodate two aircraft carriers at once. China currently operates only one aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, a retrofitted Ukrainian carrier believed to be used primarily for training purposes. In March, after months of rumors, Chinese media quoted naval officers who confirmed that China is constructing a second carrier, which would be its first indigenously produced model. Kanwa expects this new carrier to be principally based at Hainan (the Liaoning is based in Dalian).

At 700 meters long, the new base at Hainan is the longest carrier berth in the world, and the widest at 120 meters. Want China Times, citing the Kanwa report, said that construction on the base began in 2011 and was completed by 2015, although the base will likely continued to be worked on and expanded. The new carrier base is close to the existing Yulin nuclear submarine base; as Want China Times notes, “if the two bases are taken together, they will constitute the PLA Navy’s largest multirole base.”

Read the full story at The Diplomat

Think Tank: ANZUS and Asia–part 2 - a ‘hub’ far from the centre

Andrew Davies and Benjamin Schreer

PacificSentinel: This is part 2 of a 2 part piece, Part 1 can be found HERE.

The recent SDSC–CSIS report The ANZUS alliance in an ascending Asia (PDF) makes an interesting argument about the US–Australia alliance becoming a ‘central hub’ for American policy in the Pacific. We explained yesterday why we aren’t sold on the geographic/military disposition aspect of the argument. But alliances aren’t all about warfighting, and there’s also political value in having like-minded countries shoulder-to-shoulder in environment-shaping activities and in helping to underwrite a security order that’s to our liking.

Even so, we’d argue that it’s hard to disentangle the politics from the geography. For the US to assure all of the players in the region that it’s prepared to back the established order and protect the interests of its allies and partners, it needs to have a credible military presence. And if, as we argued yesterday, Australia’s geographic role has diminished in wartime due to modern force projection capabilities, its role in the geopolitics of North Asia in peacetime is even less clear.

Editorial: Rand Paul, Offshore Balancing, and the Asia-Pacific

Rand Paul (Wiki Info - Image: Wiki Commons)

By Robert Farley

Kentucky’s Rand Paul might not be all that important for U.S. Asia policy–then again, he’s running for president.

What about Rand Paul? Elected in the Republican midterm wave of 2010, the libertarian Paul seemed to sit uneasily with the Kentucky electorate, which historically had remained happy with a succession of conservative Democrats and statist Republicans. Known now mostly for his critiques of the national surveillance state, Paul has become perhaps the most prominent, and eloquent, representative within the GOP for the strategic position known as “offshore balancing.” The position, worked out in traditional “realist” academic circles during the 1990s and 2000s, argues that the United States should abandon its post-war focus on formal alliances, step back from entanglement in Eurasian politics, and adopt a less interventionist pose worldwide.

Paul’s association with offshore balancing stems, in large part, from his father’s embrace of the concept. Ron Paul ran for President in 2008 on a non-interventionist platform, distinguishing himself from the rest of the GOP field. The elder Paul has made a career of arguing the quasi-isolationist (to borrow the term of his critics) position on foreign affairs.

But what does offshore balancing mean for the Asia-Pacific? We can imagine that a Paul presidency would resist the temptation and risk of commitment to Japan or any of the South China Sea claimants with respect to potential conflict with China. If offshore balancing can’t avoid war over a few rocks in the East China Sea, or a few piles of sand in the South China Sea, then it’s not worth very much as a strategic perspective.

Read the full story at The Diplomat

Editorial: The Political Perils of Offshore Balancing

By Chris Mclachlan

Moving U.S. forces out of range of Chinese threats could create more problems than it solves.

Over the past two decades, China’s military modernization has emerged as a growing threat to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. To balance this threat, U.S. defense analysts have been reevaluating current military strategy for the region, which has centered on the forward basing of U.S. military forces along the Japanese archipelago. One notable proposal that has attracted considerable attention is offshore balancing, which would have the U.S. reposition its forces in Guam, Hawaii, and San Diego. From a military standpoint, these locations would put U.S. forces out of range of most Chinese counter-intervention threats. However, from a political standpoint the repositioning of U.S. forces would raise a series of issues that could endanger the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

For U.S. defense analysts, the biggest threat to American interests (PDF) in the Asia-Pacific has been China’s military modernization and its ability to threaten U.S. forward deployed forces stationed in Japan. While U.S. forces in Japan maintain robust capabilities and a diverse range of firepower, Chinese investments in counter-intervention capabilities can greatly constrain U.S. forces ability to operate. The major concern of China’s military modernization (PDF) has been its development of advanced conventional ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. China has also been greatly expanding its ISR capabilities (PDF) to further improve the lethality of these systems. These counter-intervention systems pose a formidable threat to U.S. forward forces in the Asia-Pacific. 

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News Story: 3 major flaws in US Offshore Control Strategy against China

In an article written for the Washington-based National Interest magazine, Bill Dries, a retired US Air Force colonel, said the Offshore Control Strategy suggested by retired US Marine Corps colonel T X Hammes and retired US Army colonel R D.Hooker has three major weaknesses when applied to China.

As Hammes and Hooker state in their article, the strategy is aimed at denying China the use of the sea inside the Pacific first island chain, which extends from the Kuril islands to the Philippines. It will defend the sea and airspace of the first island chain nations and dominate the airspace and maritime territory outside the chain. The strategy seeks to take advantage of certain geographical locations to block China's key imports and exports to weaken the nation's economy, according to Hammes and Hooker.

Read the full story at Want China Times

News Story: China Threat - Air-Sea Battle vs. Offshore Control?

By WENDELL MINNICK

TAIPEI — There are doubts in Washington that a US president would ever approve the bombing of China. This notion demonstrates that the Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle operational concept is seriously flawed, said T.X. Hammes, a senior researcher in strategy and future conflict at the department’s National Defense University.

Hammes told Defense News that no president has ever authorized the bombing of China, including during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Yet one of Air-Sea Battle’s basic tenets is aerial bombing of command-and-control hubs, mobile missile launchers, air bases, and port facilities.

Hammes has written about an alternative strategy, Offshore Control, in several articles and papers since 2012. In his latest article, co-authored with Richard Hooker, National Defense University’s director for research and strategic support in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, they argue that Offshore Control offers a less provocative military option.

“When you bomb China it becomes a passion over politics issue, making it harder to get China to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Bombing makes it so much harder to return to the status quo before the conflict,” Hammes told Defense News. “You are not going to have a decisive win with China without going nuclear, so you need to engage them and walk them back from the edge.”

Read the full story at DefenseNews

Editorial: Dangerous Neighborhoods - U.S.-Japan Naval Cooperation

<< PHILIPPINE SEA (Nov. 16, 2007) American and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) ships transit in formation at the end of ANNUALEX 19G, the maritime component of the U.S.-Japan exercise Keen Sword 08. The exercise is designed to increase interoperability between the United States and JMSDF and increase their ability to effectively and mutually respond to a regional crisis situation. Kitty Hawk operates from Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Stephen W. Rowe (Released)  Image: Wiki Commons

By M. Elizabeth Guran

References to U.S. retrenchment are a wake-up call for increased strategic engagement.

U.S.-Japan naval cooperation has long been recognized as the critical core of the U.S.-Japan security relationship; the navies’ success in rebuffing the Soviet naval threat in the 1980s is legendary. The successful cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) even helped to buoy the broader alliance relationship, which was suffering at the time from trade-related and other economic challenges. The key elements that were so important to the naval relationship—strategic clarity, definitive roles and missions, and operational engagement—emanated from a strong and committed security alliance.

As preparations are finalized for U.S. President Barack Obama’s upcoming trip to Japan, a reminder of what made these two navies so successful during a strategically challenging period of history can provide useful lessons. Today, the two navies once again find themselves on the front lines in the Asia-Pacific region as maritime challenges increase. Yet the U.S.-Japan security alliance is facing its own set of challenges as Washington and Tokyo come to terms with what the new environment means for them and their interests. Some analysts are calling into question the U.S. commitment to the alliance relationship. Others say that Japan is moving towards greater independence from the alliance and that it is hedging its bets to ensure that it has the ability to defend itself.

This reality is not lost on the two navies. Navies first and foremost do their countries’ bidding in support of national interests. The JMSDF, in particular, has stepped up its strategic reflection and analysis, particularly concerning the role it should play in the rapidly changing global environment and the corresponding capabilities and functions it should be developing. One such analysis that stands out over the past year is an article (PDF) written by four senior JMSDF officers and published in the JMSDF Staff College Review. As part of their assessment of the current and future security environment, the authors state that the U.S. presence in the region will change in accordance with its “off-shore balancing strategy” and as such, Japan needs to be prepared to take over some of the roles and burdens previously assumed by the United States. This assumption is based on the authors’ understanding that U.S. budgetary constraints and other potential conflicts in the world will affect the U.S. ability to maintain its presence in the region. 

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Editorial: Slouching Toward Offshore Balancing

By James R. Holmes

With America facing fiscal constraints, are lawmakers absentmindedly adopting offshore balancing?

Is America slouching toward offshore balancing? Maybe so, if columnist Lee Smith has it right. Writing over at Tablet, Smith claims that Harvard professor Stephen Walt is this generation’s George F. Kennan, a foreign-policy intellectual whose appraisal of the geopolitical landscape, and of the proper methods for managing it, captures the attention and allegiance of top policymakers.

Smith refers mainly to Walt’s commentary on Israel. To oversimplify, Walt maintains that the “Israel lobby” wields outsized influence in Washington. Such influence, quoth he, deforms U.S. foreign policy in favor of a small, beleaguered ally that contributes little to the alliance while ensnaring the United States in disputes remote from its interests. To make decisions that truly suit the national interest, then, officialdom should afford Israel no more deference than any other small Middle Eastern country.

But this is about more than Israel. Walt extrapolates his logic to all American allies under his doctrine of “offshore balancing.” Taken to extremes, international relations’ “realism” is all about big powers. Small fry mainly just get in the way. Though he doesn’t couch it in such Clausewitzian terms, Walt proclaims in effect that the United States attaches too much value to its overseas alliances. By exaggerating the value of alliances, it takes on efforts of magnitude and duration far disproportionate to its interests. In other words, it invests too heavily, and for too long, in arrangements that provide dubious returns. 

Read the full story at The Diplomat