By Admiral Dennis Blair and General Masayuki Hironaka
Time to reassess whether American extended deterrence in East Asia is still strong.
Just what kind of a weapon detonated in North Korea on January 6? Scientists and intelligence specialists are working hard to find the answer. It will be important to understand in detail the ability of North Korean scientists to build a two-stage thermonuclear bomb, but we do not have to wait to work out some of the policy implications of the event for the U.S.-Japan alliance, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, and the trilateral relationship.
Immediate commentary predictably chewed over the old argument of whether the United States could have prevented North Korean nuclear weapons development, by its own actions or by persuading China to do so. While it is possible to recommend alternative diplomatic strategies or stronger military postures, no experienced observer has put forward a comprehensive approach that stands any better chance of success in slowing the program than those that have been attempted in the past.
The development of an effective thermonuclear bomb will not change the fundamental military and geopolitical balance on the Korean Peninsula. It would be suicidal for the Kim regime to initiate either a major conventional attack across the DMZ or to use any kind of weapon of mass destruction against the Republic of Korea, Japan or the United States. It is important for the United States to make an authoritative statement that emphasizes the military realities: 1) a major conventional attack would be defeated by combined forces of the Republic of Korea and the United States and 2) a WMD attack would be met with a devastating retaliatory nuclear strike by the United States. Both alternatives would result in the end of the Kim regime.
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