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By Kun-Chin Lin and Andrés Villar Gertner
We’re entering a new phase in political signaling by China and the U.S.
Two events in recent days have turned the tables on Chinese initiatives since 2009 in taking control of the vast waters of the South China Sea. On October 27, a U.S. guided missile destroyer passed within 12 miles of the Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea (SCS) on a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FNO) which China condemned as a threat to its national sovereignty. Two days later the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague rejected China’s argument that the Court had no jurisdiction over the Philippines’ challenge to Chinese territorial claims in SCS.
Since 2009, China has effectively been one step ahead of other claimants and the U.S. in getting what it wants through a deliberately confounding mix of rhetoric and actions. While reiterating its commitments to peaceful resolution and joint development, Beijing has demurred at signing on to a Declaration of Conduct and Code of Conduct with ASEAN nations, provoked skirmishes with Philippines and Vietnamese vessels, set up oil rigs in disputed waters, reclaimed land on shallow reefs on an astounding scale, and continually projected an expansive historical claim while abstaining from defining it to meet the legal requirements of international maritime law. The success of these encroachments – often termed the salami-slicing approach – hinges on no one calling the Chinese military presence bluff and taking a counter-stance in disputed waters. In 2012, the Philippines Navy pulled back from a military standoff against Chinese maritime surveillance ships in the Scarborough Shoal, only to have China renege on reciprocal withdrawal and thus gain exclusive control of the shoal. This failed deal was brokered by the U.S.
The FNO of the USS Lassen was a change in momentum, but not primarily in the sense of American brinkmanship thwarting Chinese advances. There is no indication that coercion will be applied to roll back de facto Chinese control over features and maritime areas, or to compel Beijing to make concessions on historical claims, or to bring in a U.S. military show of force of the scale seen during the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1955, 1958, and 1996. In fact, in the short-run, the inevitable diplomatic vitriol and militarization by China may seem counterproductive to the aim of peacefully resolving disputes. China would surely augment its infrastructure and military capability over specific islands and ocean zones.
Read the full story at The Diplomat