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| Image: Flickr User - Naval Surface Warriors |
By Sam Bateman
Continuing the debate on the value of U.S. FONOPs, Sam Bateman responds.
Jonathan Odom’s lengthy critique of my writings on U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea reminds me of Ken Booth’s famous statement in his classical work Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea, that “the changing law of the sea is too serious to be left to international lawyers.” This is especially the case with serving military lawyers whose job it is to defend their country’s position. While I will take Commander Odom to task on some legal issues he raises, my main concern with his critique is the lack of attention to the political and strategic implications of the recent U.S. FONOPs.
What Is the Purpose of the FONOPs?
I stand by my claim that the purpose of the U.S. FONOPs is unclear. This view has been reinforced recently, by the several commentaries pointing out that confusion surrounds just what the U.S. was trying to achieve with its FONOPs in the South China Sea. These operations are starting to look somewhat clumsy and hardly worth the trouble that they are causing, including for the image of the U.S. in the region.
As commentators have pointed out, steaming inside 12 nautical miles of a low tide elevation that should only have a 500 meter safety zone and claiming it as innocent passage risks being de facto acknowledgement of China’s claims. The implication is that it may have been better to go the full distance and go right in, conduct weapon practices, operate helicopters, and so on, simply to demonstrate that it was not innocent passage. But of course, the U.S. is unlikely to do that.
There are significant political downsides to what the U.S. is doing in the South China Sea. Apart from the deliberate provocation of China, unequivocal support for American actions has only been shown in the East Asian region by the Philippines. Other countries are concerned about the downward spiral of trust between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea. In the worst case scenario, they are fearful that if current trends continue they will be forced to take sides. Indonesia has strongly criticized the FONOPs, Japan has declined to participate, and Singapore has been ambivalent. Even Australia, as Washington’s loyalist supporter in the region, has backed off from joining the FONOPs.
While the U.S. claims to be not taking sides in the sovereignty claims, its FONOPs in the South China Sea send a political message that can easily be misconstrued. The USSLassen may also have steamed past features claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam, but China was clearly the target of its operations. That is how most people in the region see it. It is unfortunate that in the streets of Beijing, Hanoi and Manila, the U.S. is believed to have taken sides. In this way, U.S. engagement in the South China Sea has had the unfortunate consequence of boosting nationalistic fervour in all three capitals.
In his purely legal approach, Commander Odom does not recognize the security dilemma that has emerged between the U.S. and China. This is characterized by strategic distrust and an apparent action–reaction dynamic in which initiatives on one side are being driven by the actions of the other. The U.S. FONOPs have only fuelled this security dilemma and added to the militarization of the South China Sea.
Read the full story at The Diplomat