By Denny Roy
China’s actions in the South China Sea have gone far beyond matching or reacting to the actions of others.
The construction of artificial islands is the latest and most dramatically tangible example of what many observers call increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, where China is one of six governments that claim sovereignty over some of the same territory. A key question is whether Chinese assertiveness is the result of provocations by other countries. If so, these other countries should cease and desist if we want to de-escalate tensions in the region.
There are three theories of China’s approach to the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. The first is that Beijing is completely defensive: What the Chinese really want is to lay aside the sovereignty question and continue business as usual, perhaps including the joint exploitation of resources in contested areas. Chinese officials have often stated this as their aim. The exceptionally expansive claim Beijing makes to some (unspecified) form of ownership over most of the South China Sea might be explained as merely an initial bargaining position from which the Chinese would eventually retreat. This theory would explain assertive Chinese actions responses to unilateral steps taken by rival claimants. The implication is that China could abide the status quo, but cannot tolerate the risk of appearing to tacitly accept other claimants changing the status quo to China’s detriment. If others did not violate the truce first, neither would China.
The second theory is that China intends to increase its control over the disputed territory at the expense of other claimants and has pre-prepared policy actions for doing so, but fears appearing “aggressive.” Therefore Beijing waits for an action by an adversary government to provide an excuse for a premeditated and disproportionate retaliatory action that results in a permanent enhancement of China’s position. According to this theory, China’s desire for self-aggrandizement is balanced by its aversion to encouraging anti-China security cooperation among the other Asia-Pacific countries.
The third theory is that China is committed to realizing something close to its maximum claim in the South China Sea according to its own timetable. Since Beijing hopes to achieve its goal with a minimum of contention, its policy is to gradually strengthen its position over a period of many years, with the objective of forcing rival claimants to conclude that their best recourse is to submit to the Chinese demand for bilateral negotiations (which would inherently favor China, the much larger and stronger party). Under this theory, Beijing will follow its own plan to unilaterally change the status quo in China’s favor regardless of what the other claimants do, although it may speed up its game plan to ensure China stays ahead of policy moves by its rivals.
Read the full story at The Diplomat