19 February 2015

Editorial: The Myth of India's 'Shift' Toward Israel


By Nicolas Blarel

Despite recent perceptions to the contrary, India’s relationship with Israel continues to be limited.

Even before Narendra Modi became Prime Minister of India in May 2014, many predicted a strengthening of India’s partnership with Israel. Some argued that the origins of a new approach could be traced back to Modi’s visit to Israel as Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2006 when he promised he would come back to Tel Aviv as Prime Minister. Subsequently, Modi was labelled during the electoral campaign as “Israel’s best friend in South Asia.” Sushma Swaraj, who served as chairwoman of the Indo-Israel Parliamentary Friendship Group from 2006 to 2009 and who had called Israel as “reliable partner” in 2009, was also named Minister of External Affairs in the new government.
The proclaimed shift in India’s Israel policy was then allegedly confirmed by the highly publicized September meeting between Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu which was the first held at the prime ministerial level since Ariel Sharon’s visit to India 2003. Following this symbolical visit, India’s Home Minister Rajnath Singh visited Israel in November 2014 and Sushma Swaraj is scheduled to also visit Tel Aviv in June. In addition, many important defense deals were signed following the Bharatiya Janata Party’s electoral victory. The first major development was the announcement in October 2014 that India would acquire 262 Barak-I missiles for India’s Navy. Then, in a surprise move in October 2014, India reportedly favored the purchase of the Israeli Spike anti-tank guided missiles launchers and missiles over its U.S. competitor, the Javelin.
Another example of the deepening defense relations is the first visit this week of an Israeli Defense Minister, Moshe Ya’alon, to India since the two countries normalized their diplomatic relations in 1992. There are reports that India and Israel will finalize major defense deals, including the purchase of two additional Phalcon AWACS and four aerostat radars for $1.5 billion. A final indicator of the possible underlying changes occurring in India’s West Asia policy are the rumors that India could change its voting position in the U.N. from an unconditional Pro-Palestine position to abstention. Are we therefore witnessing a paradigmatic transformation in New Delhi’s Israel policy? 

Read the full story at The Diplomat