By Robert Farley
Expanding the zone of expertise on maritime, aerospace, and strategic affairs will elevate and broaden the conversation
The ongoing debates over airpower theory, seapower theory, and strategic theory more generally have glided over three issues: the division between domains of action, the division between military and civilian contributions, and the increasingly transnational nature of the modern strategic community. Until we grapple with these three factors, we’re missing a big part of the process of how we grow and groom specialists in strategic affairs.
First, should we be worried about making “airpower” and “seapower” theorists, as opposed to “strategic” theorists? Are the air and sea sufficiently distinct in strategic terms merit separation? Colin Gray has argued that airpower is sometime seapower, sometimes ground power, and sometimes just airpower; is this sufficient to justify different fields of strategic training? A century ago, when the implications of airpower were not yet well understood, and when we were still searching for ways to describe the problems of managing the commons, it perhaps made sense to distinguish conceptually between airpower theory and maritime theory (or between airpower and seapower). Now, especially given that the most important problems associated with either involve joint action (PDF), this distinction is less defensible.
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