04 June 2012

Editorial: Coping with a G-Zero World

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World. This interview was conducted by Assistant Editor Harry Kazianis

Ian Bremmer speaks with The Diplomat about a “G-Zero World,” China’s rise and why no single nation can fill the global power vacuum.

In your latest book Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World, in many respects what you describe is a massive global power vacuum with no nation able to fill it. What do you mean by a G-Zero World? And in the Asia-Pacific, what does this mean for China?
A G-Zero World is one in which no single power or alliance of powers is willing and able to provide consistent global leadership. Not the United States or Europe. Not an emerging power like China or a bloc of emerging powers. Not the G-8 or the G-20. Each of these countries is preoccupied with challenges and risks at home, and each of these institutions produces a less coherent agenda as a result.
That said, though the United States, still the world’s most powerful country by far, will have to do more with less, bolstering the U.S. presence in Asia has become the top U.S. foreign policy priority. This will continue to be the case no matter who wins the presidential election in November. The motive is two-fold. First, Washington wants to use the fear that China’s rise generates among its neighbors to improve existing security ties with current allies (like Japan and South Korea) and to build partnerships with new ones (like India and Indonesia). Second, the U.S. hopes to profit from a broader and deeper commercial presence in the region that is most likely to provide the global economy with most of its dynamism over the next several years. Washington’s push to join and broaden the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement designed to liberalize the economies of members on both sides of the Pacific, is evidence of this trend. Negotiations over this pact don’t include China.
For the moment, the U.S. strategy in Asia isn’t to contain China, but merely to hedge against its growing political and economic clout. That could change, however, if U.S.-Chinese relations worsen significantly.

Read the full 2 page interview at The Diplomat