By Harry Kazianis
Much has been written over the last several years concerning China's Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy, including in The Diplomat. And rightly so – Chinese military planners have devised a strategy that combines the military capabilities of diesel and nuclear submarines, mines, cyber warfare, anti-satellite weapons and swarm attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles. The goal: to slow, limit or deny a superior U.S. force from aiding a potential rival in combat in areas like the South China Sea, Taiwan or elsewhere near China's coast. Such a strategy seems to aim at the heart of American forces in the region. With one A2/AD weapon having been labeled a “carrier-killer” – with a 1,500+ kilometer range anti-ship ballistic missile – it's easy to see why.
Yet, for all China’s growing capabilities, there seems to be a lessening utility for such a strategy. U.S. forces, now largely free of major commitments in Iraq and soon Afghanistan, are in the process of rebalancing their focus to the larger Indo-Pacific region. U.S. defense strategists have already begun to develop plans for an AirSea Battle Concept that attempts to negate any Chinese plans, and through new long range bombers, submarines, and forces spread throughout the region, the United States plans to make sure it keeps access to all regions of the Indo-Pacific. Freedom of the seas and global access to the maritime commons has remained for countless decades a hallmark of U.S. interests, and the new U.S. strategy intends to keep it that way.
Read the full story at The Diplomat