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| B-52 Stratofortress (Image: Wiki Commons) |
By Van Jackson
The B-52 overflight was a failure in nuclear signaling.
When it comes to North Korea, the United States and South Korea fundamentally misunderstand what it means to demonstrate resolve. In recent years, their actions have undermined the credibility of their own threat-making. And their policy decisions, though well-intentioned, are ironically creating conditions that make future circumstances more dangerous for both countries.
Global media recently whipped up a storm when claims emerged that North Korea tested a hydrogen bomb. The U.S. government’s rhetorical response was one of extreme skepticism — not about the fact of a nuclear test, but that the test reflected the hydrogen capability that North Korea claimed. In response to the test, however, the United States deployed a B-52 nuclear-capable strategic bomber to South Korea, escorted by South Korean fighter jets. Now the United States is considering sending still more nuclear-capable assets to Korea. This would be a mistake.
The message to North Korea that the B-52 dispatch was intended to convey could hardly be clearer: we have nuclear superiority over you, and if you go too far, you’ll experience what that’s like firsthand.
As ever, the B-52 constitutes a rather thinly-veiled nuclear threat. There’s nothing inherently wrong with this, of course. The B-52 remains useful to the United States for a number of reasons; I’m not making an argument about the U.S. nuclear triad. But in the manner employed to signal against North Korea, B-52 deployments are proving to be the height of strategic folly.
Read the full story at The Diplomat