Image: Wiki Commons |
By Ankit Panda
Saturday’s election results emphasize that Beijing and Washington must take stock of a shifting Taiwanese identity.
In the few days since Tsai Ing-wen’s historic election as Taiwan’s new president (and first female president), much has been written on the consequences for cross-strait relations and the island’s foreign policy. I won’t bother reiterating those points here, but there is an unmistakable takeaway from the results of January 16 that bears emphasizing: more so now than ever, the processes and outcomes of ‘Taiwanization’ have been legitimized. For both China and the United States, this development, more so than any other in the country’s domestic politics, will be of critical importance going forward.
‘Taiwanization’ broadly refers to an unmistakable trend in the island’s identity politics that has existed for decades, but has accelerated since Taiwan’s transition to democracy in the 1990s. Notably, the term came into use following the third Taiwan strait crisis in 1996, when China conducted missile tests to warn Taiwan against the prospect of election Lee Teng-hui, who was seen as a ‘Taiwanization’ proponent. Since then, Taiwanese–and not just the youth–increasingly see themselves as Taiwanese first, Chinese second. Last year, the percentage of Taiwanese identifying as such reached historic highs. The way this identity dynamic has manifested in the country’s politics is interesting and divided along partisan lines.
Read the full story at The Diplomat