By Nah Liang Tuang
Pyongyang’s motivations might have had more to do with prestige and international bargaining leverage.
Early this month, North Korea detonated a fourth nuclear device near its Punggye-rinuclear facility. In the immediate wake of the test, interest focused on Pyongyang’s claims that the device was a thermonuclear explosive or hydrogen bomb (which is far more powerful than Pyongyang’s first three tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013 which were non-thermonuclear). However, an important question that was overlooked is why the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is conducting nuclear tests, rather thanwhat kind of devices were tested.
What Drives Pyongyang’s Nuclear Exhibitionism?
Shortly after North Korea detonated a nuclear device at 10 a.m. local time on January 6, 2016, the DPRK’s state media proclaimed that the device was a hydrogen bomb, and that such devices served as defenses against external enemies. Even as we should not discount the Kim regime’s siege mentality and Pyongyang’s corresponding obsession with national security and deterrence, of which the North Korean nuclear weapons program is a key component, it could be argued that the defensive justification for periodic testing serves as a thin legitimizing veneer for what are essentially domestic and negotiative drivers for nuclear demonstrations.
Considering that neither the U.S. nor South Korea have made incursions into North Korea since the 1950-1953 Korean War, that much of the DPRK’s military forces are deployed near the demilitarized zone at the border separating the two Koreas, and that South Korea’s capital, Seoul is within range of a massive array of North Korean artillery, it is apparent that Pyongyang already has a sufficient conventional deterrence against any possibility of hostility from the U.S.-South Korean alliance. With this in mind, the former’s nuclear weapons look like overkill and hint at the existence of other driving motivations supporting its nuclear arms development.
Read the full story at The Diplomat