By Zachary Abuza
To understand the group, look at its other tactics.
On 14 January, nine militants staged a barricade style attack at a Starbucks in central Jakarta. Small IEDs were detonated, and the militants engaged security forces for almost two hours. Two civilians, a Canadian and an Indonesian were killed. Five of the attackers were killed and four were arrested. Fortunately Indonesian security forces responded quickly and professionally, mitigating what could have been a much more costly attack that appears to have been perpetrated by the Islamic State or Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
The attack in Jakarta should not have surprised anyone; this type of barricade style attack has been seen from Mumbai to Paris. With low technical requisites and a high probability of spreading fear and garnering media attention, it has been the weapon of choice, including in Southeast Asia.
On 30 June 2015, a Malaysian court convicted a man and his son for fighting with ISIL and planning terrorist incidents at home. But it was not a wave of bombings they were plotting, but rather the kidnapping of politicians. While hostage taking, executions and barricade style attacks garner less concern from security services than bombings, this is potentially an important development at both the tactical and strategic levels for Southeast Asian militants. If we are to understand the real impact of ISIL on Southeast Asian militancy, it is this.
Hostage taking has become the face of ISIL terror in the Middle East. The grisly executions of orange-jumpsuited victims, mimicking Guantanamo Bay uniforms, have become more and more macabre. Dr. John Horgan called the recent execution videos “sadism at a clinical level.” These videos are instantly disseminated across a host of social media platforms, and rather than repulse people tend to broaden the group’s appeal as they try to outbid their rivals, equating sadistic violence with religious zeal.
Likewise, there have been a number of “barricade” style hostage taking events perpetrated by ISIL-inspired militants in Europe and beyond, most spectacularly on 13 November 2015 in Paris in coordinated attacks that left 129 dead. And it is these barricade-style attacks that pose a serious threat in Southeast Asia. As J.M. Berger explained, “Al Qaeda’s love of elegance was a distraction… But in reality, AQAP carried out only a handful of attacks, and at a languid pace, over the course of many years.” But these low-tech, low-cost, and high probability of success attacks are tailor made for those who have fought with ISIL, but have little other experience than as front line troops.
The threat posed by ISIL in Southeast Asia is small but present. There are an estimated 800-1,000 Southeast Asians supporters of ISIS, including those who have traveled to Iraq and Syria, their family members, those killed in battle and arrested, as well as those returned by Turkish security forces. It also includes the first wave that has already returned home to Malaysia and Indonesia. The Soufan Group estimates the number of Southeast Asian combatants to be 600, lower than official regional estimates of 900. Several have returned and plotted or executed attacks, including the first bombing plots in Malaysia and the first attempted chlorine bomb at an Indonesian mall. Already, more Southeast Asians have joined ISIL and the Al Qaeda-linked Al Nusra Front than ever joined the anti-Soviet mujahideen. ISIL has revitalized terror networks in Southeast Asia.
Yet, despite this concern as well as the previous wave of terrorism by the Al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah, there has been very little use of hostage taking, beheading, or barricade-style attacks as a tactic by Southeast Asian militant groups. That should be expected to change, with the success of ISIL, the proliferation of their ideology, and return of veterans from Syria over the coming few years.
Read the full story at The Diplomat