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| Bukkeukseong-1 or “Polaris-1” missile test launch |
By Nah Liang Tuang
Pyongyang’s missile failures must be seen for what they are – teething issues the Kim regime is determined to overcome.
Following the test of an underwater missile ejection system of the first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in May this year, North Korea conducted an even more ambitious test towards the end of last month – a flight test of the aforementioned SLBM, the Bukkeukseong-1 or “Polaris-1” missile. Despite the test being conducted from a floating barge, implying that Pyongyang lacks the confidence or capability for a full-fledged underwater test, the Bukkeukseong-1 failed upon launch, with missile debris subsequently seen floating in the Sea of Japan. But even as anti-DPRK watchers might feel a sense of schadenfreude when Pyongyang’s missile development team stumbles and falls, or even snigger at the lackluster qualities of their missiles, gloating is not only premature but ill-advised.
The Nature of Weapons Development
Based on available information, the North Korean Bukkeukseong-1 is likely a copy of the obsolete Soviet SS-N-5 “Sark” SLBM. Taking the development of the Sark as a guideline for the operational introduction of Pyongyang’s first SLBM, it can be seen that the Soviets took about four years from 1958-1962 to design and flight test the first SS-N-5. Notwithstanding the fact that Moscow’s missile research was backed by the full scientific and industrial muscle of the USSR, while Pyongyang has to make do with the decidedly inferior military-industrial complex driving its missile program, the latter can take however long it needs, and make all the blunders necessary (no matter how embarrassing) to build and deploy its first successful SLBM. It is of little comfort to Washington, Seoul and Tokyo whether the Korean People’s Navy fields its first SLBM in 2019, or takes twice the time the Soviets did, and puts SLBMs out to sea in 2023.
Next, those who decry the North Korean “Polaris-1” as being inferior or retrograde, citing the missile’s predicted short range of 890 nautical miles, which makes even a strike on Guam improbable, and its poor accuracy (only 50 percent of all missiles are likely to land within 2.8 km of a target), should note this is only the DPRK’s first SLBM prototype. As long as the Kim regime endures, its missile research and manufacturing sector can adopt a long run time horizon to implement modifications and improvements to this missile while it is still a prototype. Consequently, the final successfully flight-tested version might be a far more threatening creature than the one designed in the initial blueprints.
As proof of the non-static nature of North Korean missiles, it can be seen that the DPRK’s introduced missiles have increasing range and capabilities. From the Hwasong-5 in 1985 with a range of 320 km and a 1000 kg warhead, to the Rodong-1 in 1990 with a 900-km range and identical warhead, and finally the Taepodong-2, the technological basis for theUnha rocket which successfully lofted a satellite into space on December 12, 2012, it is evident that Pyongyang’s scientists and engineers remain determined to advance their nation’s missile forces. It can thus be safely assumed that they will be equally committed to their SLBM project.
Read the full story at The Diplomat