07 November 2015

Editorial: The Road to a US-Pakistan Nuclear Deal Begins in Islamabad

By Saira Bano

Pakistan needs to move towards international norms, not away from them.

Before the official visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, to the U.S. on October 22, the media in Pakistan and India were buzzing with reports that the United States was exploring a nuclear deal with Pakistan in order to constrain its nuclear weapons program, believed to be the most rapidly expanding on earth. Pakistan, on the other hand, has ruled out any possibility of a deal that places conditions on its nuclear weapons program. Pakistan is looking for a deal similar to the one India got, in which New Delhi was given access to the international market for its civilian nuclear program without putting significant constraints on its nuclear weapons program.

Given its poor nonproliferation track record, weak democracy, fragile economy, and support for terrorist organizations as a strategic tool, Pakistan will be unable to end its nuclear isolation without committing to strong nuclear nonproliferation conditions.

The India-US Nuclear Deal

The United States signed a nuclear deal with India in 2005, which successfully ended three decades of international sanctions against New Delhi and made India the only non-NPT country that is allowed to have nuclear trade with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) along with its nuclear weapons program. The Bush administration saw India as a counterweight against a rising China and wanted to boost New Delhi’s economic and military capabilities in order to counterbalance Beijing. The administration was determined to improve relations with India, and to accomplish that it was willing to change the rules and norms of the nuclear nonproliferation that Washington worked for decades to establish.

A key architect of Bush’s India policy and U.S. ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, noted, “President George W. Bush based his transformation of U.S.-India relations on the core strategic principle of democratic India as a key factor balancing the rise of Chinese power.” Blackwill added that without this China factor at the fore “the Bush administration would not have negotiated the civil nuclear agreement and the Congress would not have approved it.” Both countries have a shared interest in China’s rise in Asia. Pakistan is also strategically important for the U.S., as its support is key to stability in Afghanistan. However, unlike India, Pakistan does not share common strategic interests with Washington; rather, both sides often have contradictory policy objectives vis-à-vis Kabul.

Read the full story at The Diplomat