By Poorvie P. Patel
Concerns that Australian uranium could end up in an Indian nuclear bomb are overstated.
During the recent G20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey, a senior Indian diplomat tweeted, “With the completion of procedures, including administrative arrangements, the #IndiaAustralia Civil Nuclear Agreement will enter into force.” He described the development as a “milestone achievement.” While support for the deal in New Delhi is unequivocal, there are voices in Canberra who are concerned that the agreement undermines traditionally important Australian non-proliferation interests. These fears are misplaced. The risk of India diverting uranium to its weapons program are overstated and ignore the incentives for New Delhi to abide by civil nuclear regulations.
In the face of rising energy demands and international pressure to address its carbon emissions, increasing nuclear energy production continues to be a popular solution for the Indian government. India’s active nuclear weapons program, combined with its non-membership of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), has made the acquisition of nuclear materials difficult over the years. However, the 2008 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement paved the way for Indian civil nuclear trade. Last week, on the sidelines of the G20 Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with his new Australian counterpart, Malcolm Turnbull, and both leaders finalized a nuclear deal, which will most likely be ratified by the end of this year and allow Australia to sell uranium to India on a commercial basis.
In 2014, during former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s visit to New Delhi, when he and Modi settled on uranium trade through a memorandum on “Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” Abbott promised Australia as “a long-term reliable supplier of uranium to India.” However, Australia’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) recommended earlier this year that uranium sales to India should only commence after concerns about non-proliferation, nuclear regulation, and proper safeguards were addressed. JSCOT also called for India to set up an independent nuclear regulator, dismissing the current one as ineffective and mired in bureaucracy. These parliamentary recommendations were based on Australia’s commitment to the global non-proliferation regime. As the world’s third largest producer of uranium, Australia has never exported uranium to any country outside the NPT, but an exception will be made for India. The original 2014 agreement had been tabled by an Australian Parliament concerned that Australian uranium would end up in India’s nuclear weapons program.
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