By Robert Farley
Instead of engaging China, the United States could (with great cost) have isolated it.
In a recent interview with the National Interest, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger accepted some responsibility for bringing China into the international system. Instead of engaging China, the United States could (with great cost) have isolated it. Was there an alternative to engagement, a way to avoid the growth of great power rival?
First, to call long-term engagement a “strategy” might go a step too far. The United States clearly facilitated the growth of Chinese power after Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the early 1970s. This included improved terms of trade, diplomatic support in international venues, and on some occasions direct military assistance. The U.S. supported China because it saw Beijing as a useful counter-weight to Moscow and (to a lesser extent) New Dehli.
After 1989, the United States no longer saw an increase in Chinese economic and military power as a useful end in and of itself. Rather, Washington preferred to believe that Chinese economic growth (supported by trade and investment from the United States) would inevitably produce regime liberalization, and potentially the collapse of the CCP. At the very least, integration into the liberal international economic order would “tame” China, and make it a positive contributor within that system.
Whether this amounted to a China “strategy,” or merely a way to rationalize the preferences of American firms which wanted access to China’s markets and labor pools, the engagement of China brought much heavier trade, investment, and integration between the U.S. and Chinese economies. The United States eschewed the tools that states often use to keep potential competitors down, preferring to believe in the possibility of positive sum outcomes.
Read the full story at The Diplomat