By Casey Michel
Recent reports suggest a shift in the region’s security calculations.
For the last few years, one of the largest questions facing Central Asia pertained to the Chinese security component in the region. Beijing’s economic hegemony, especially as it pertained to hydrocarbons, stood plain to see. Between infrastructural development and gas transit, China’s supplanted Russia as the region’s leading economic and energy pole. To choose but one statistic, Russia’s natural gas imports from Central Asia have dropped some 75 percent since their 2008 high – all while China continues bringing further transit routes online, morphing into the region’s primary export client.
Moscow, however, retained a security advantage in the region: CSTO bases, defense systems overlap, potential expansion moving forward. As the U.S. fumbled out of the region, and despite Washington’s sudden uptick in security interest, Moscow remained the primary security patron within Central Asia.
That, however, may be shifting – and we may finally be gaining a glimpse of the form China’s security extension into Central Asia is likely to take. Details remain sketchy and lightly sourced, but seem to point to a potential shift in the region’s security calculations.
Read the full story at The Diplomat