By Ji Yeon-jung
Striking a balance with the NPT regime requires a careful regional and global calculus.
India’s nuclear status-quo is a conundrum: Should it be legitimized, and if so, why? This ongoing argument is sowing discord within the international non-proliferation regime.
Recently, India reaffirmed its fundamental position on the non-proliferation treaty (NPT): New Delhi will not join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. It is, however, prepared to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements with pledges of no-first-use and no-attack against non-nuclear weapons states, as stated by Ambassador D. B. Venkatesh Varma on October 21. This has provoked debate: Does the situation benefit India or does the advantage remain with non-nuclear weapons parties in the regime? And can a middle ground be reached that safeguards the NPT regime, and introduces pathways to non-member states like India.
Whether or not they are part of the NPT, all states are part of the dilemma. Is it better to encourage India’s approach to reducing the risk of using nuclear weapons by accepting its position? On the positive side, India’s compliance with the no-first-use pledge may encourage it to avoid nuclear adventurism. If this is accepted by the NPT member states, it could increase the effectiveness and reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used at times of war. The next question, then, is whether one can trust India.
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