By Akhilesh Pillalamarri
Can South Asia’s states overcome the legacy of their histories?
A few weeks ago, my colleague Ankit Panda noted that some of Asia’s most fragile states are in South Asia, based on the results of the Fragile States Index (FSI). The ranking’s methodology was determined by numerous social, economic, and political indicators. One thing is clear: South Asian states are relatively weak and many of their governments cannot meet their objectives, such as implementing their own laws. For example, this is clear when one considers the inability of India to implement its own public health policies. According to the sociologist Max Weber, a weak state is unable to maintain a monopoly of violence over its own territory. This brings to mind Pakistan and its abysmal failure to control its own territories and maintain internal security. In fact, most states in the region, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka score low on the index and are close to failure.
So, why are South Asia’s states so weak? This problem is brilliantly discussed by Francis Fukuyama in his book The Origins of Political Order. In it, Fukuyama argues that South Asian states never developed the bureaucracies or institutions that enabled them to govern their territories effectively. This was due to the fragmented nature of society in South Asia. There are many caste, linguistic, and religious groups in the region which historically only interacted with themselves, though they lived side by side. Additionally, the region was dotted with numerous local rulers, princes, rajas, nawabs, sultans, nayaks, you name it. This enormous diversity made it difficult for any state to impose a single working bureaucracy on the land or for a “normal” civil society to emerge. As Machiavelli noted, it is extremely difficult to rule over a land with many lords. The result of all this for governance is that governments in South Asia have generally hovered above society without really establishing their writ within it. Internal weakness may also be responsible the non-vigorous foreign policy attitudes of many modern South Asian states because it leads to a focus on domestic affairs.
Read the full story at The Diplomat