By Amit R. Saksena
Structural and policy problems prevent the SCO from being an effective Central Asian security organization.
With the administration of President Barack Obama intent on withdrawing all but 10,000 troops from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the region is bracing for a security vacuum that is primarily affected by a lack of cooperation and interstate awareness in the vicinity. Although the recently concluded presidential elections in Afghanistan do offer a glimmer of hope for the restoration of a legitimate, autarkic government, the possibility of a relapse far outweighs the practicality of such hope.
While there is a multilateral organization in the region that could potentially manage this looming regional instability, it is not yet up to the task.
Instituted by the members of the Shanghai-Five plus Uzbekistan in the months preceding September 11, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is more of a private club, with ambiguous organizational mandates and individual state-driven interests, rather than a competent collective body. The “Shanghai Spirit,” a guiding doctrine of the SCO, dictates sovereignty and the importance of non-interference in the state affairs of other members. For the Central Asian republics, this principle has provided a measure of immunity from Chinese or Russian forays into their territories. However, this principle has failed the SCO on a few prominent occasions in the past, which questions the capability of the forum to function efficiently as a regional power bloc.
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