By Robert Farley
Using espionage for gain in negotiations is an age-old tactic.
Are the norms of appropriate espionage changing? Glenn Greenwald’s new book, based on revelations from Edward Snowden, critically highlights an episode from the 2010 UN Security Council vote on sanctions against Iran. At the behest of U.N. ambassador Susan Rice, the NSA targeted the delegations of at least four countries for surveillance and analysis in order to provide the U.S. with better intelligence on how those states might vote. Although the overall impact remains unclear, this collection could have given the U.S. the ability to make targeted “side payments” to the countries in question, to frame its rhetoric differently, or to have a better sense of the progress of the campaign.
Greenwald’s use of this example has evoked some debate among diplomatic and intelligence analysts, as it strays far from the central themes of the Snowden Project, which involve mass data collection and global public surveillance. Along with the recent indictment of five PLA officers on charges of cyber espionage, it drags the focus onto the question of how nations spy on one another, and where the appropriate boundaries for “legitimate” espionage lie.
Read the full story at The Diplomat