By Robert Farley
Air war has, in effect, become as costly as naval war. What are the implications for strategy?
Admirals are notoriously conservative regarding their capital ships. By the early twentieth century, the cost of a battleship and the time required for construction demanded extraordinary care with respect to the survival of the vessels. Capital ships do not simply represent or implement national power; because of their great cost and the long periods of construction, they effectively constitute national power. The loss of a battlefleet represented a catastrophic expenditure of national treasure, not to mention blood. This logic was on the minds of the German and British commanders at Jutland, as well as dear to the Japanese admirals who so desperately husbanded their strength into 1944.
Air forces have not, historically, conceived of air frames in the same way. Cheaper, with quicker production times, and carrying fewer personnel, generals have viewed aircraft as more expendable. Even as late as Vietnam, the USAF suffered the loss of over 2,000 aircraft across the course of the conflict.
Read the full story at The Diplomat